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The Schizophrenia of Physician Extender
Utilization
Thomas R. McLean, MD, JD, FACS, ESQ*
I. INTRODUCTION

The Patient Centered Medical Home (PCMH) is coming.' As an
evolutionary form of retail medical clinics (RMC), 2 which relies heavily on
the use of physician extenders (PEs), 3 the PCMH is "the most promising
In
[approach] to delivering higher-quality, cost-effective primary care.'
theory, the greater involvement of PEs, (including nurse practitioners
(NPs), physician assistants (PAs),' and others6 ) in the PCMH will result in
* CEO Third Millennium Consultants, LLC, Shawnee KS. tmclean@isp.com. The author
wishes to thank LSU Law Professor Edward P. Richards for reviewing this paper and
making suggestions that have improved the readability of this paper. This research was
made possible, in part, by an in-kind donation by Westlaw.
1. The prestigious health care policy journal Health Affairs recently devoted an entire
issue to PCMH. See generally 29 Health Aff. 785-1081 (2010).
2. Herein, a RMC is defined broadly to be health care clinic, regardless of its location,
that is staffed by physician extenders and primarily serves a walk-in patient population. See
infra note 3.
3. Herein, PE is construed broadly to include "any individual who provides a medical
service in lieu of a physician." See Thomas R. McLean, Crossing The Quality Chasm:
Autonomous Physician Extenders Will Necessitate A Shift To EnterpriseLiability Coverage
For Health Care Delivery, 12 Health Matrix 239, 243 n. 19 (2002); cf DeBakker v Hanger
Prosthetics, 688 F. Supp. 2d 789, 792-93 (2010). Not everyone connected with health care
delivery can be construed to be a PE. As the "scope of practice of a licensed orthotist ...
does not include the right to diagnose a medical problem or condition," an orthotist cannot
be a PE. Id.
4. Health Policy Brief Patient-CenteredMedical Homes, Health Aff. (Sept. 14, 2010),
http://www.health affairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?briefid=25. Whether the PCMH
improves primary care capacity, or is merely a re-engineering of how primary care is
delivered, depends on how "primary care" is defined. Mark W. Friedberg, Peter S. Hussey &
Eric C. Schneider, Primary Care: A CriticalReview of the Evidence of Quality and Cost of
Health Care, 29 Health Aff. 766, 769-70 (2010). Implicit in this article is the view that
PCMH will re-engineer primary care to increase its capacity; a view that is consistent with
many of the provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Id. at 770; Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified in scattered sections of21, 25-26, 29 & 42 U.S.C.).
5. Despite the broad definition for PE used in this article, most of the literature focuses
on the two most common types of PEs: PAs and NPs. Therefore, out of necessity, most of
PE examples used herein are based PAs and NPs.
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"improved coordination and communication with patients." Accordingly,
when PE-provided care is coupled with the electronic medical record
(EMR), the PCMH is expected to make health care delivery more efficient
and less costly.7 Geisinger Health Service, an early adopter of the PCMH,
is already a success story.' By employing PEs to monitor 125-150
outpatients per PE, Geisinger was able to reduce its projected costs by
seven to eight percent because better-monitored patients consume fewer
emergency room services.9 Importantly, although PE-provided care is
believed by many to be of a similar quality to physician-provided care,o
Geisinger has been able to achieve economic success without negatively
affecting patient care.
Yet, the PE technology behind the PCMH has still not been perfected."
In February 2009, the Department of Veterans Affairs disclosed that more
than 100 veterans with glaucoma lost their eyesight after they were
mismanaged by improperly supervised optometrists (i.e., PEs for
ophthalmologists).1 2 Indeed, it appears that PE iatrogenic harm is
6. What distinguishes one PE type from another is primarily their scope of practice and
the degree to which society allows them autonomous practice. Tine Hansen-Turton et al.,
Convenient Care Clinics: The Future of Accessible Health Care, 10 Disease Mgmt. 61, 66
(2007) (observing that as a general rule most states grant NPs more autonomy than other
PEs.). Other demographics that tend to differentiate PEs are gender and practice settings:
most NPs are female and practice in office settings; while most PAs are male and work in
hospital settings (especially the operating room). Am. Acad. Physician Assistants, Nat'l
at
2
(2009),
available
Census
Report
Assistant
Physician
http://www.aapa.org/images/stories/
Data 2009/National Final with Graphics.pdf; see also Perri Morgan & Roderick S.
Hooker, Choice of Specialties Among Physician Assistants in the United States, 29 Health
Aff. 887, 889 (2010).
7. Patient Centered Primary Care Collaborative, NJ FQHC Medical Home Pilot (Feb.
The expected cost12, 2010), http://www.pcpcc.net/content/nj-fqhc-medical-home-pilot.
saving associated with PCMH are predicated on a number of technologies, including
improvements in telecommunication, however, the focus of this article is limited to issues
associated with the substitution of PEs for physicians. Id.
8. James Arvantes, Geisinger Health System Reports that PCMH Model Improves
Quality, Lowers Costs, Am. Acad. Family Physicians (May 26, 2010),
http://www.aafp.org/online/en/home/publications/news/news-now/practicemanagement/20100526geisinger.html.
9. Susan Dentzer, Geisinger Chief Glen Steele: Seizing Health Reform's Potential to
Build a Superior System, 29 Health Aff. 1200, 1206 (2010).
10. McLean, supra note 3, at 261 n. 119. See also William M. Sage, Over Under or
Through: Physicians, Law, and Health Care Reform, 53 St. Louis U. L.J. 1033, 1046-47
(2009).
11. Technology has many definitions. For our purposes, we will define technology to be
"a manner of accomplishing a task especially by using [specialized] methods or knowledge."
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary: Based on Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary,
Eleventh Edition 504 (2005). Accordingly, as PE extenders have specific training and are
being deployed to accomplish of the goal of facilitating health care delivery while reducing
costs, PE extenders can be viewed as technology.
12. John Maa & Kristen Hedstrom, College Advocates for Ensuring Quality Eye Care
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increasing.13 For example, after a supervised PE misdiagnosed a patient
with a pulmonary embolus as having "diffuse myalgia," the patient died.14
In another case, a plaintiff received a $435,000 award from a fertility clinic
after a NP injected her with two-day old sperm stored in an unlabeled
syringe." In part, adverse outcomes like these occur because PEs, like
physicians, are human and do foolish things from time to time. But in part,
some PE iatrogenic injuries occur because PEs are not physicians.16
Accordingly, it is not surprising that when complex patients are treated by
improperly supervised PEs, the stage is set for an epidemic of iatrogenic
injury.17
So, from both an economic and legal perspective, the adoption of a
health care policy predicated on the use of PEs to leverage the efficiency of
physicians and improve the coordination of patient care is schizophrenic.
As used here, schizophrenia is not intended to be understood in its clinical
context. 8 Rather, schizophrenia is used in this article in its colloquial sense
to mean "split-mind."l 9 PE schizophrenia is manifested in the divergent
views held on the PCHM with respect to its ability to provide upfront cost
savings, 20 while seemingly ignoring the potential for increased backendfor America's Veterans, 95 Bull. Am.C. Surgeons 8, 9 (2010).
13. A decade ago when I penned my article on PEs, McLean, supra note 3, finding
documentation of PE negligence or a lack of supervision was difficult. In contrast, during
the writing of this paper, whether I was searching Westlaw or Google, I found a plethora of
examples of PE negligence and a lack of PE supervision.
14. Lubin & Meyer, $1.7 M Settlement in Pulmonary Embolus Wrongful Death Case,
http://www.lubinandmeyer.com
(2007),
Report
Trial
Malpractice
Medical
/cases/pulmonaryembolus.htmi (last visited Apr. 25, 2011).
15. Verdict Settlement Summary: Chambliss v. Ramsey & Coastal Area Health Educ.
Ctr., VerdictSearch Weekly, 2004 WL 1857853 (June 28, 2004).
16. Am. Acad. Nurse Practitioners (AAPN), FrequentlyAsked Questions: Why Choose a
Nurse Practitioneras Your Healthcare Provider? (2007), http://www.npfinder.com/faq.pdf
(acknowledging that NPs "provide high-quality health care services similar to those of a
doctor" (emphasis added)); Am. Acad. Physician Assistants (AAPA), Our Practice Areas,
http://www.aapa.org/about-pas/our-practice-areas (last visited Apr. 25, 2011) (taking the
position that PAs "work in all medical and surgical specialties and settings as part of
physician-PA teams" thereby suggesting that PAs provide care that is subordinate to
physician care); cf AAPA, About PhysicianAssistants, http://www.aapa.org/about-pas (last
visited Apr. 25, 2011) (stating that as "part of their comprehensive responsibilities, PAs
conduct physical exams, diagnose and treat illnesses, order and interpret tests, counsel on
preventive health care, assist in surgery, and prescribe medications," which suggest that PAs
provide services that are virtually indistinguishable from physicians).
17. Maa, supra note 12, at 9.
18. What
is
Schizophrenia?,
Nat'1
Inst.
of
Mental
Health,
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/ schizophrenia/what-is-schizophrenia
.shtml (last visited Apr. 25, 2011) ("Schizophrenia is a chronic, severe, and disabling brain
disorder that has affected people throughout history.").
19. Schizophrenia, eMedicalHealth, http://www.emedicinehealth.com
/schizophrenia/articleem.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2011).
20. Arvantes, supra 8.
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liability in the forms of medical malpractice claims. 2' Indeed, Tim
McGreeny has likened the health care reform embodied in the PCMH as a
rearranging of the deck chairs on the Titanic.2 2
The purpose of this article, therefore, is to examine the schizophrenia
with respect to PE-delivered healthcare. Part 1I examines the economics
behind the RMC and its progeny, the PCMH. If PEs do become fungible
with primary care physicians (PCPs), it is unclear how RMCs/PCMHs will
be more cost-efficient when PEs demand reimbursement similar to
physicians, and the PCMH model provides few incentives for PEs to deliver
less negligent care than their physician supervisors deliver. Part III
examines how well traditional legal techniques (scope of practice
limitations, standard of care, and medical malpractice) are currently being
used to police the healthcare delivered by PEs. While these legal regulatory
techniques mirror those applied to physicians, we will see that the law treats
Finally, part IV explains why the new
NPs and PAs differently.
administrative control techniques for PE quality management, (and in
particular the use of quality-metric defined report cards), are unlikely to
become a health care panacea. This article concludes that the schizophrenia
associated with PE-delivered healthcare makes sense only when it is
delivered in a health care system that is covered by a no-fault type of
professional liability insurance system.
II. PE ECONOMICS: RMCS AND PCMHS
A. RMCs
Health care delivery forever changed in 2000. In that year, the successor
organization to Minute Clinic opened its first RMC.23 Over the ensuing
decade, Minute Clinic expanded its RMC operation to more than fivehundred locations, primarily in CVS pharmacies and Target stores.24
Minute Clinic has been joined in this market by three-hundred and fifty
Take Care clinics (a wholly owned subsidiary of Walgreens),2 5 more than
one-hundred independently owned RMCs 26 located in Wal-Mart stores, 27
21. McLean, supra note 3, at 272. Medical malpractice claims against PCMHs may
increase because, compared to physicians, PEs have less training and the PCMH health care
delivery offers more opportunity for communication errors. Id.
22. Tim McGreeny, PCMH Movement Requires Real Transformation, TransforMed
(2010), http://www. transformed.com/CEOReports/Titanic.cfm (last visited Apr. 25, 2011).
23. Minute Clinic: Our History, CVS, http://www.minuteclinic.com
/about/history.aspx (last visited Apr. 25, 2011).
24. Id.
25. Take Care: Our Company, Walgreens, http://takecarehealth.com
/Our Company.aspx (last visited Apr. 25, 2011).
26. At Selected Stores: Medical Clinics, Walmart, http://i.walmart.com
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and a few other smaller operations.28 Interestingly, while many other
demographic details of RMCs have been published, neither the Rand
Corporation, 29 nor Deloitte30 has offered an estimate for RMC market size
(either in number of stores or retails sales). 3 1
Still, RMC economics have been well described. While the specific
numbers tend to vary with the publication, the upfront investment needed to
start a RMC is in the ballpark of $150,000 to $200,000, which covers the
cost to retrofit a CVS, Walgreens, or Wal-Mart facility.32 Next, $500,000 to
$600,000 per year is needed to cover the clinic's operating expenses.33 But
here, under labor costs, is where RMCs catch a break. Rather than
employing a family practice physician (who receive approximately
$185,740 per year)3 4 like a traditional medical clinic would do, RMCs
employ NPs (who receive approximately $89,000 per year) 35 or less
commonly PAs (who receive approximately '$87,614 per year).36
/i/if/hmp/fusion/ClinicLocations.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2010).
27. Get
Well.
Stay
Well,
Walmart,
http://www.walmart.com/cp/WalmartClinics/1078904(last visited Apr. 25, 2011).
28. Retail
Clinics:
Update
and
Implications, Deloitte,
3
(2009),
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets
/Documents/us chsRetailClinics 11 1209.pdf [hereinafter Deloitte].
29. See generally Robin M. Weinick et al., Policy Implications of the Use of Retail
Clinics, Rand Health (2010), http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical
reports/TR810.html.
30. See generally Deloitte, supranote 28.
31. RMCs are unlikely to want to disclose detailed financial information because many,
if not most, are operated at a loss. See infra, Part II, Section A, on "loss-leaders." See also
Julie A. Muroff, Retail Health Care: "Taking Stock" of State Responsibilities, 30 J. Legal
Med. 151, 168-69 (2009). This publication is discussed in greater detail later in this article.
32. Chen May Yee, Some Walk-in Clinics Closing After Boom, Star Trib. (Aug. 11,
2008), www.startribune.com/business/26850829.html.
33. Greg T. Spielberg, Wal-Mart Medical Clinics Stumble, Bus. Wk. (June 17, 2009),
http://www.businessweek. com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/jun2009/db20090617_759590.htm.
34. Study Links Primary Care Shortage with Salary Disparities,Science Daily (Sept. 13,
2008), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008
/09/080909205410.htm. On average, a primary care physician sees twenty to twenty-five
patients per day (i.e., 2.5-3.0 patients per hour). Mark Murray et al., PanelSize: How Many
Patients Can One DoctorManage?, 14 Fam Pract. Mgmt. 44, 47 (2007).
35. Nurse PractitionerSalary, Indeed.com (Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.indeed.com
/salary/Nurse-Practitioner.html. On average, a NP sees sixteen patients per day (i.e., 2.0
patients per hour).
CNA, Understanding Nurse Practitioner Liability, 44 (2009),
for
Download/Risk
File
http://www.cna.com/vcm content/CNA/intemet/Static
Control/Medical Services/UnderstandingNursePractitioner
Liability.pdf. NPs are rarely asked to work overtime. Id. at 45.
36. Physician Assistant - Medical, MySalary.com, http://wwwl.salary.com/PhysicianAssistant-Medical-salary.html (last updated Jan. 2011). It was not possible to find an
average figure for the number of patients a PA sees per hour, perhaps because many PA
work in operating rooms where such a figure would be misleading. Many urgent care PA
job descriptions, however, state that the PA will see 2.0 - 2.5 patients per hour. See, e.g.,
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Accordingly, if a RMC charges $50-75 per visit,3 7 the clinic will operate in
the black while seeing only two patients per hour.
By treating a
Yet, RMCs are many things to many patients.
disproportionate number of patients with sinusitis and providing
immunizations, RMCs provide care to a population of patients who are
underserved by PCPs. 39 Patients have readily embraced RMCs' key
marketing features: transparently low pricing (which simplifies bill
analysis),40 immediate evaluation,41 and the need to spend only fifteen to
thirty minutes in the clinic42 (which compares favorably to the hours
patients spend waiting to see a PCP for the same condition).
Despite such favorable economics and patient benefits, market realities
have been hard on RMCs. This is because the average RMC treats only 1.1
patients per hour,43 a figure well below the two patients per hour needed to
break even.4 As a consequence, several RMCs have been shuttered, while
overall market growth has slowed substantially. 45 So, if RMCs have
inadequate clinical material (i.e., patients) to cover their operational cost,
how are so many RMCs able to stay in business?
The answer is a loss leader. A loss leader is any good or service that is
Providence St. Joseph Medical Center (Burbank, California) Emergency Department
2010),
26,
(Aug
Assistant,
Physician
http://www.healthjobsnationwide.com/advancedpracticejobs/index.php/Emergencythis position no
Department-Physician-Assistant/?actionwiewjob&joblD=185139)_(as
longer exists, this website is no longer available).
37. Shirley S. Wang, Can Treatmentfor Chronic Diseases Boost Use ofRetail Clinics?,
Wall St. J. (Sept. 10, 2009), http:/Iblogs.wsj.com/health/2009/09/10/can-treatment-forcf Pamela Lewis Dolan, Retail Clinics:
chronic-diseases-boost-use-of-retail-clinics;
Struggling to Find Their Place, Am. Med. News, Mar. 8, 2010 (reporting the patients are
charged $55-65 for a typical RMC visit).
38. Dolan, supra note 37.
39. Ateev Mehrotra et al., Retail Clinics, Primary Care Physicians, and Emergency
Departments:A Comparison OfPatients' Visits, 27 Health Aff. 1272, 1272 (2008).
40. Kristin E. Schleiter, Retail Medical Clinics:IncreasingAccess to Low Cost Medical
CareAmongst a Developing Legal Environment, 19 Annals Health L. 527, 528-29 (2010).
41. Arif Ahmed & Jack E. Fincham, Physician Office vs Retail Clinic: Patient
Preferences in Care Seeking for Minor Illnesses, 8 Annals Fam. Med. 117, 121 (2010).
42. Schleiter, supra note 40, at 529 (citingHansen-Turton, supra note 6, at 63).
43. Dolan, supra note 37. This statistic raises an interesting collateral issue: can PEs
maintain their clinical competencies at such low clinical volumes? As PCMHs are likely to
supplant RMCs, this issue may be moot. However, a detailed discussion of what is
necessary for PEs to maintain their clinical competencies is beyond the scope of this article.
See also infra, Part II, Section B.
44. Dolan, supra note 37.
45. Wang, supra note 37; see also Yee, supra note 32 (Minute Clinic has closed fortyfour non-profitable locations in Walmart stores). However, Walmart may be in the process
of shifting its strategic alliance away from Minute Clinic and towards larger health care
providers. See Walmart Partners With Local Hospitals for In-Store Clinics, Awesome
Capital (Sept 9, 2010), http://www.awesomecapital.com/1/post/2010/09/walmart-partnerswith-local-hospitals-for-in-store-clinics.html.
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sold at or below the seller's price in the hope that such a sale will increase
customer traffic thereby increasing the sales of other goods sold at full
price.46 In RMCs, ninety percent of prescriptions written by PEs are filled
by the clinic's pharmacy, and fifty percent of patients who are evaluated by
the PEs in RMCs purchase other unrelated goods from the clinic.47 Thus,
unlike a traditional physician-operated primary care clinic where profits are
generated by high volumes of patient traffic, 48 RMCs generate their profits
by using PE-provided services as a loss leader.
While some
Still, RMCs' loss leader strategy is not infallible.
commentators remain optimistic about the future for RMCs,4 9 other
commentators are becoming increasingly pessimistic. For instance, The
Rand Corporation has observed that:
[T]here is comparatively little empirical evidence to support many of the
assertions made by [RMC] supporters and their detractors, and considerable
additional research is needed. The role that retail clinics play may change
in the face of health insurance expansions under health care reform, the
growing shortage of primary care physicians, and the increased use of
health information technology.o
Similarly, the majority of Deloitte's report on RMCs discusses provider
relations, workforce concerns, and other issues that have the potential to
limit further RMC market expansion.5 1 But Deloitte tried to end its report
on a positive note by observing "the growth and evolution of retail clinics
reflect[s their] opportunities for disruptive innovation." 52 This is an
interesting observation because disruptive innovation describes a process
by which a product or service takes root initially in simple applications at
the bottom of a market and then relentlessly moves 'up market' eventually
displacing established competitors.53
Deloitte may be on to something.5 4 The chief societal value of RMCs
46. Loss Leader,BussinessDictionary.com, http://www.businessdictionary.com/
definition/loss-leader.html#ixzz 142zGxIGR (last visited Apr. 25, 2011).
47. Muroff, supra note 31, at 168-69.
48. See generally Murray, supra note 34. In a non-capitated/non-salaried environment,
physicians are compensated for the number of services they provide. So, any physician who
wants to maintain their income after their reimbursement per service has been cut (a
common occurrence in the last decade) must either provide more services per patient or
increase the number of patients they evaluate. Id.
49. William Winkenwerder, Retail Medical Clinics: Here to Stay?, Deloitte (2010),
/view/en US/us/Industries/US-federal-government/center-forhttps://www.deloitte.com
health-solutions/76632fel0c2fb 11OVgnVCM100000 ba42fOOaRCRD.htm.
50. Weinick, supra note 29, at 50-51.
51. Deloitte, supranote 28, at 10-11.
52. Id. at 12.
(2009),
Christensen
Concepts: Disruptive Innovation, Clayton
53. Key
http://www.claytonchristensen.com/ disruptiveinnovation.html.
54. Viewing RMCs (and PCMHs) as the introduction of a disruptive innovation into the
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may not be in their profitability, but rather in the ability of RMCs to be an
More specifically, RMCs have
evolutionary demonstration project.
demonstrated the ability of PEs to provide patient care in a semiautonomous fashion without apparently triggering excessive liability. For a
PE, "semi-autonomous" practice occurs when the PE evaluates and treats a
patient under the nominal supervisor of a physician who is not onsite.ss
Kristen Schleiter has observed that the "success of retail medical clinics is
dependent on mid-level practitioners providing care that is equal or superior
to that of physicians when providing the same care for the same
problems," 56 but the devil is in the details of what constitutes "equal or
superior." For now, let us focus on just one aspect of RMC-PE care: its
freedom from litigation as an index of PE quality of care.
In contrast to PE-provided medical care in other venues, it appears as if
patients do not file lawsuits against RMCs or their PE employees. A search
of Westlaw (both state and federal case law and jury verdicts and
settlements), Google (using several combinations of key words), and the
local courthouse58 all failed to identify any published cases of alleged
medical malpractice against either a RMC or a PE practicing in a RMC.
Several reasonable explanations can be offered for this apparent lack of
litigation, including: sampling error (the relatively small number of patients
treated by RMCs may have allowed an alleged case of RMC negligence to
be overlooked); publication bias (a case of RMC medical malpractice
litigation may have resulted in such a small verdict or settlement that the
case was deemed to be not news worthy); and good attorney work (Fortune

health care market is a very different concept than increasing the level of market competition
to improve health care quality - a technique favored by many reformers. See Choice and
Competition in Healthcare, Comm.
for
Econ.
Dev. (Nov. 4, 2009),
http://www.ced.org/news-events/health-care/394-choice-and-competition-in-healthcare.
While a detailed discussion of competition in the health care market is beyond the scope of
this article, suffice it to say that because of the differential impact of competition on the
various segments of the health care market there is no uniform agreement on the net benefits
of health care competition. See generally Penelope Dash & David Meredith, When andHow
Provider Competition Can Improve Health Care Delivery, McKinsey Q. (2010),
https://www.mckinsey
quarterly.com/HealthCare/Strategy Analysis/When-and how_provider-competition-cani
mprove health care delivery_2690.
55. Schleiter, supra note 40, at 567. For a PE, "semi-autonomous" practice occurs when
the PE evaluates and treats a patient under the nominal supervisor of a physician who is not
(necessarily physically present) onsite. Id. Direct PE supervision would occur if the
physician was present onsite and reviews the PE's treatment plan before the patient was
discharged; while autonomous or independent PE practice occurs when a physician provides
no oversight into the care rendered by a PE. See infra, Part III, Section A.
56. Id. at 564. The term "mid-level practitioners" is a synonym for PEs.
57. See, e.g., McLean, supra note 3, at 270-71.
58. Johnson County District Court Public Records, http://www.jococourts.org/ (last
visited Apr. 25, 2011).
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500 companies like Wal-Mart, Walgreens, and CVS, hire attorneys who use
confidentiality clauses to protect their corporate clients).
But perhaps the best explanation of the lack of apparent litigation against
RMCs is their use of a no-tolerance policy. If a PE is found to have
provided care that deviates from the RMC's evaluation and treatment
Such a policy makes sense. Deepprotocol, the PE is terminated.
pocketed Fortune 500 companiesso cannot afford to be in the business of

providing medical care to high-risk patients or medical care that is
inherently high-risk. 61 Remember the loss leader concept - RMCs are not
so much in the business of alleviating human suffering as they are in the
business of selling pharmaceuticals and other goods. Thus, RMCs screen
potential patients to minimize their risk.62 Nor can Fortune 500 companies
that operate RMCs afford to retain a PE who repeatedly fails to properly
screen patients or prescribes the wrong treatment thereby exposing the
entire operation to a medical malpractice lawsuit.63
In short, as disruptive innovation, RMCs have demonstrated that PEs can
provide care to select patients with minimal upfront costs, seemingly low-

59. Interview with Valarie Lawson, NP, (Oct. 25, 2010). Take Care will not necessarily
admit to summarily firing one of its PE for failing to follow the corporation's protocol.
However, Take Care does expect PEs to comply strictly with the corporation's screening and
treatment protocols. Interview with Travis, Support Center Representative, Walgreens Take
Care Clinic (Nov. 2, 2010); see also Top-Quality Care, Minute Clinic,
http://www.minuteclinic.com/about/quality/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2011). "Top-quality health
care depends on strict quality control. And, at the heart of MinuteClinic's quality control is
our Electronic Medical Records system. Guided by our proprietary software, our Electronic
Medical Records system ensures that procedures are followed consistently. It guards against
mistakes. And, it alerts practitioners when a condition should be referred elsewhere." Id.
60. This statement assumes Walmart, Walgreens, and CVS are directly operating RMCs
located on their premises. This, however, is not true. See supra, Part II, Section A.
Accordingly, this simplifying statement is made to avoid a discussion of the vicarious
liability these organization have for allowing RMCs to operate on their premise; a topic
beyond the scope of this article. But see infra, Part III, Section C.
61. Unlike physicians who receive some liability protection in the form of caps on
medical malpractice damages, institutional providers face full liability exposure. See
generally McLean, supra note 3, at 277-83 (discussing hospital and Managed Care
Organization liability).
62. Interview with April Scott, PA, (Nov. 1, 2010). According to Ms. Scott, RMCs
often screen away patients who could have been treated by PE; if the corporation had
allowed the PE to treat such patients or such conditions. Id. See also infra, Part 111, Sections
A - B.

63. Anyone who has ever donated blood understands the importance of screening. Prior
to allowing an individual to donate blood, blood banks ask the donor detailed personal
questions to screen out any donor with any risk for having a complication (or contaminating
the blood supply). Donate Blood - What to Expect When Donating Blood, Red Cross,
http://arcblood.redcross.org/donationprocess.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2011). A single
wrong answer to any of the screen questions will prevent a donor from donating, either
temporarily or permanently. Id. But by screening out donors with any risk, those who are
allowed do donate rarely if ever suffer a permanent injury from the act of donation. See id.
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backend (liability) costs, and high patient satisfaction. Accordingly, RMCs
have paved the way for PEs to become integral participants in the PCMH.
B. PCMHs
1. Overview
PCMHs are in the business of alleviating human suffering. The concept
of a "medical home," or a repository of all of a patient's records, was first
articulated by the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) in 1967. 4 A
quarter-century later, in 2002, the AAP "expanded the concept [of the
PCMH] to refer to primary care that emphasizes timely access to medical
services, enhanced communication between patients and their health care
team, coordination and continuity of care, and an intensive focus on quality
and safety."
In 2007, the AAP, along with three other primary care medical
organizations that represented 300,000 PCPs,66 articulated seven principles
that were designed to transform medical homes into PCMHs. In brief, these
seven principles are: (1) a personal physician (to provide continuous and
comprehensive care); (2) who receives appropriate reimbursement; (3) by
leading a team of PEs; (4) who both facilitate access and (5) coordinate and
integrate (6) quality care; (7) by considering the whole person's needs.
Collectively, these principles fundamentally alter the paradigm of primary
care delivery by shifting away from an isolated physician, whose goal is to
provide piecework services to patients, to that of a team whose goal is to
advance the health of an entire panel of patients.
64. Patient Centered Medical Home, Improving Chronic Illness Care (2006-10),
http://www.improvingchroniccare.org/index.php?p=PatientCentered Medical Home&s=224.
65. Id.
66. Id. The three other organizations are the American Academy of Family Physicians,
Id.
the American College of Physicians, the American Osteopathic Association.
Collectively, these organizations represent seventy-five percent of the primary care
workforce. Thomas Bodenheimer & Hoangmai H. Pham, Primary Care: Current Problems
and Proposed Solutions, 29 Health Aff. 799, 799 (2010) (estimating the primary care
workforce to be 300,000 physicians and 100,000 NPs).
67. Patient Centered Primary Care Collaborative, Joint Principles of the Patient Centered
Medical Home (2007), http://www.pcpcc.net/content/joint-principles-patient-centeredmedical-home; cf Bodenheimer & Pham, supra note 66, at 799 (citing Barbara Starfield,
Primary Care: Balancing Health Needs, Services, and Technology 30-31 (1998) (identifying
the traditional principles for delivering primary care services to be: (1) first-contact care; (2)
continuity of care; (3) comprehensive care of the individual; and (4) coordination of care).
Accordingly, it appears that the concept of team delivery and the reimbursement schemes
that are employed are the principles that differentiate traditional primary care from PCMH
primary care. Id.
68. David Margolius & Thomas Bodenheimer, Transforming PrimaryCare: From Past
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Beyond these principles, there is no agreed upon definition for the
PCMH, or what services are to be provided by a PCMH.6 9 Not surprisingly,
no two PCMHs are alike.70 Still, by following the clinical course of an
idealized patient71 with congestive heart failure (CHF) 72 through a PCMH,
it is possible to see how these seven principles of the PCMH interact to
create a new model for the primary care delivery. For this hypothetical, all
that needs to be understood is that Mr. Sick has CHF, a heart condition
involving decreased cardiac output and that can be monitored by tracking a
patient's weight; and that Dr. Watson is a PCP who works for a PCMH.
Dr. Watson heads up a team of providers that includes a nurse and Mr.
Holmes, who is a PE.73
On his first visit to the PCMH, just like any primary care clinic, the nurse
collects Mr. Sick's insurance and contact information, takes his vital signs,
and then places Mr. Sick into a room. Dr. Watson then takes Mr. Sick's
history, performs a physical examination, and orders appropriate laboratory
Practice to the Practiceof the Future,29 Health Aff. 779, 779 (2010); see also Lawrence P.
Casalino, A Martian'sPrescriptionfor Primary Care: Overhaul the Physician'sworkday, 29
Health Aff. 785, 786 (2010) (viewing the PCMH not as a vehicle to get physicians to see
more patients, but rather as vehicle to get physicians to adopt newer work patterns).
69. Health Policy Brief Patient-Centered Medical Homes, Health Aff. 1 (2010),
http://www.health affairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief php?brief id=25; see also Charles M.
Kilo & John H. Wasson, Practice Redesign and the Patient-Centered Medical Home:
History Promises and Challenges, 29 Health Aff. 773, 775 (2010) (arguing that the PCMH
"has been more of branding success").
70. Walter W. Rosser et al., PatientCenteredMedical Homes in Ontario,362 New Eng.
J. Med. e7(l), e7(2) (2010), availableat http://www.nejm.org
/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMpO911519.
71. My idealized patient, one who has no other associated clinical conditions, and the
hypothetical that follows, are based on my clinical experience. Cf Chad Boult et al., The
Urgency of PreparingPrimary Care Physicians to Carefor the Older People with Chronic
Illnessess, 29 Health Aff. 811, 811 (2010) (explaining that eighty percent of Medicare
spending goes to patients with four or more chronic conditions).
72. Shamai Grossman & David F. M. Brown, Congestive HeartFailure andPulmonary
13,
2011),
updated
Apr.
Edema,
eMedicine
(last
http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/757999-overview.
73. To keep things simple, I am not going to address the principles of the whole
patient's needs or reimbursement in detail. A discussion of a patient's whole needs would
add too many confounding details concerning the patient's socioeconomic status; and has not
yet been adequately studied. Christine Bachtel & Debra L. Ness, If You Build It, Will They
Come? Designing Truly Patient Centered Health Care, 29 Health Aff. 914, 915-16 (2010)
(observing that there is a disconnect between what the provider and the patient perceived
whole-person needs). Issues related to reimbursement are similarly complex. Reputable
commentators have opined that widespread adoption of the PCMH health care model would
double America's expenditures for primary care services. Robert L. Phillips & Andrew W.
Bazemore, Primary Care and Why it Mattersfor US Health System Reform, 29 Health Aff.
806, 808 (2010). See also, generally, Bruce E. Landon et al., Prospects for Rebuilding
Primary Care Using the Patient-CenteredMedical Home, 29 Health Aff. 827, 829-30
(2010); Katie Merrell & Robert A. Bereson, Structuring Paymentfor Medical Homes, 29
Health Aff. 852, 852-58 (2010).
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tests.74 The doctor's diagnosis is that Mr. Sick has CHF, and he prescribes
a diuretic (i.e., a water pill). So far, the care delivered by PCMH is
identical to the care that Mr. Sick would have received at a traditional
clinic.
Next, Dr. Watson explains to Mr. Sick that while he will be reviewing
Mr. Sick's progress from time-to-time, if all goes well they will not be
seeing each other for another year.75 Dr. Watson explains to Mr. Sick that
his progress on the water pill will be telemetrically monitored.76 That is,
after he weighs himself each morning on a special scale, that scale will
automatically send his daily weight to the PCMH. Watson informs Mr.
Sick that Mr. Holmes will be primarily responsible for overseeing his daily
progress,n so, Mr. Sick should expect a telephone call from Mr. Holmes
every-other-day for the next month.78 Of course, if Mr. Sick's condition
significantly deteriorates, Dr. Watson assures his patient that they will meet
face-to-face to review his condition. Mr. Sick agrees and then heads off to
a pharmacy to pick up his new prescription (which, like many patients, he
will occasionally forget to take). For his part, Dr. Watson finishes seeing
his scheduled patients, and then retires to his office where he reviews the
medical records generated by Mr. Holmes during the previous day.
Each morning Mr. Sick dutifully weighs himself, and Mr. Holmes
reviews Mr. Sick's progress. Two days after being evaluated by the
74. Illustrating Principle #1: A personal physician for continuous and comprehensive
care.
75. And perhaps if all goes well Dr. Watson will not even see Mr. Sick yearly. A
primary care physicians should see patients for: first visits; when a diagnostic or treatment
maneuver is must be performed by a physician; when a lengthy discussion is necessary; or
when an emotional or trust issue makes a face-to-face interaction more appropriate than a
email or telephone conversation. Casalino, supranote 68, at 786.
76. Cf Sarwat 1. Chaudhry et al., Telemonitoring in Patients with Heart Failure, 363
New Eng. J. Med. 2301, 2301 (2010) (questioning the value of telemetric monitoring of CHF
patients); Thomas R. McLean, The Offshoring of American Medicine: Scope, Economic
Issues and Liabilities, 14 Annals Health L. 205 (2005) (describing telemetric monitoring of
patients).
77. Under existing reimbursement schemes, which reward doctor-patient encounters,
primary care clinics cannot afford the luxury of allowing PEs to perform billable services.
Casalino, supra note 68, at 787. Accordingly, absent provider reimbursement reform
PCMHs are unlikely to be a viable model for health care delivery. Id at 788.
78. Illustrating Principle #3: A physician leading a team. Margolius & Bodenheimer,
supra note 68, at 780. In the PCMH model, the "bread and butter of primary care, one-onone, face-to-face visits is no longer the sole mode of caring for patients." Id.
79. Illustrating Principle #6: Quality. Health care quality is often determined by
performance measures based on evidence-based medical practices. See infra, Part III,
Section B. It is becoming increasing possible to use the EMR to automatically monitor
providers' performance measurements; and thereby to determine whether a provider is
providing quality patient care in real time. J.L. Goulet et al., Measuring Performance
Directly Using the Veterans Health Administration Electronic Medical Record: A
Comparison With External PeerReview, 45 Med. Care 73, 74 (2007).
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PCMH, Mr. Sick's weight is up 0.5 kilograms (or about one pound). After
consulting the PCMH's treatment protocol for CHF,so Mr. Holmes calls Mr.
Sick and directs him to double his daily dose of the diuretic. Mr. Holmes
also informs Mr. Sick that his laboratory test for potassium is abnormally
low. But rather than prescribing a dose of potassium over the telephone
(because dosing of replacement potassium is complex), Mr. Holmes
informs Mr. Sick that the Pharm D8 1 at the pharmacy will provide him with
detailed instructions on how to take the potassium 82 and its potential side
effects.83
Because of Mr. Holmes diligence, Mr. Sick did not retain any more
water and managed to maintain his potassium at an appropriate level, 84
thereby allowing Mr. Sick to avoid expensive trips to an Emergency Room
to have his excess water removed. Mr. Holmes' diligence also freed up Dr.
85
Watson's time so that he could evaluate new PCMH clinic patients.
This hypothetical demonstrates how PEs can be used to leverage a
physician's time to improve access to care. On a larger scale, Geisinger
Health Service leverages its 800 physicians' talents by employing more
than a thousand PEs.86 The importance of such leverage to health care
delivery can be observed in data from Canada. Rosser and his colleagues
have demonstrated that a PCP can comfortably expand the size of her
patient panel from 1,400 to 2,200 if the PCP is allowed to collaborate with a
PE.8 Thus, assuming no network effects, PEs can potentially improve
access to care by as much as fifty-seven percent.89 Given this favorable
80. A collaborative agreement or treatment protocol is a precondition for PEs to provide
health care services. See infra, Part III, Section A.
81. Pharm Ds are another type of PE. Each time the patient is handed off from one
member of the PCMH team to another member there is a potential for a communication error
to arise. See generally McLean, supra note 3. In the PCMH literature, it is assumed without
evidence that the use of EMRs will somehow reduce or mitigate handoff errors, (never mind
that EMR care plagued with their own limitations). Cf Hardeep Singh & Mark Graber,
Reducing Diagnostic Error Through Medical Home-Based Primary Care Reform, 304
JAMA 463, 463 (2010) (stating "EHRs aid in the transmission of critical information but do
not guarantee that clinicians will respond appropriately.").
82. Illustrating Principle #4: Facilitating access to care.
83. Illustrating Principle #5: Coordinating and integrating care.
84. Illustrating Principle #6: Quality.
85. Illustrating Principle #3: Team approach. See also Margolius & Bodenheimer, supra
note 68, at 780.
86. Dentzer, supra note 9, at 1205.
87. Rosser, supra note 70, at e7(2); cf Susan Okie, Innovation in Primary Care-Staying
One Step ahead of Burnout, 359 New Eng. J. Med. 2305, 2306 (Nov. 27, 2008) (in the
United States a PCP's patient panel is usually around 2000 patient per physician per year).
88. Network effect refers to how a good or service becomes more valuable when more
individuals use the good or service. Network Effect Definition, Marketing Terms.com,
http://www.marketingterms.com/dictionary/network effect/ (last visited May 1, 2011).
89. See Rosser, supra,note 70, at e7(2).
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leverage ratio and the fact that PEs work for a faction of a physician's
salary, 90 it becomes clear how Geisinger's PCMH was able to reduce its
operating cost by seven percent over three years.91
Parenthetically, the lubricant that allows the PCMH's team of providers
to function as a well-oiled machine is the EMR.9 2 A fully integrated EMR
- one that gathers physicians' notes, laboratory studies, and radiographic
images - significantly enhances the efficiency of physicians and PEs. 9 3 As
a general surgery resident (1981-87), I literally spent hours each day calling
other physicians to coordinate patient care and making "rounds" in
radiology and the various laboratory suites to gather information. Now,
thanks to the integrated EMR, I can sit at my desk and gather this same
information in minutes. (In addition, I cannot remember the last time
someone complained about my handwriting.) 94 In the PCMH, the fully
integrated EMR will automatically gather consultants' reports and
telemedically generated outpatient data (like Mr. Sick's daily weights or a
diabetic's glucose level). In doing so, the PCMH's EMR significantly
ramps up the efficiency of the PEs, thereby allowing PEs to monitor even
more outpatients.

90. See Nurse Practitioner Salary, supra note 35; see also Physician Assistant Medical, supra note 36.
91. See Arvantes, supra note 8.
92. See Kate Ackerman, Health IT Key to Patient-Centered Medical Homes,
iHealthBeat (Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.ihealthbeat.org/features/2010/health-it-key-topatientcentered-medical-homes.aspx; see also Casalino,supranote 68, at 789.
93. See Dan Belletti, Christopher Zacker & C. Daniel Mullins, Perspectives on
Electronic Medical Records Adoption: Electronic Medical Records (EMR) in Outcomes
Research, 2010 Dovepress J.: Patient Related Outcome Measures 29, 31-35,
www.dovepress.com/getfile.php?filelD=6210. The metadata in EMRs contains a wealth of
evidence concerning the conduct of providers. See Thomas R. McLean, Big Brother and the
Need for a PerformanceMeasure Integrity and FraudDetection Act, 42 Law/Tech. J. 10, 10
(2009) [hereinafter Big Brother]; see also Thomas R. McLean, EMiR Metadata: Uses and EDiscovery, 18 Annals Health L. 75, 76 (2009). However, a detailed discussion of EMR
metadata evidence is beyond the scope of this article.
94. This is not to say that integrated EMR are a panacea. See Lora Bentley, VA
Problems HighlightImportance of EMR Standards Work, IT Business Edge (Mar. 8, 2010,
3:56:32 AM), http://www.itbusinessedge.com/cm/blogs/ bentley/va-problems-highlightimportance-of-emr-standards-work/?cs=39894 (discussing data errors and software glitches);
see also Myra Dembrow, Veterans Affairs Hospital Affected by EMR glitches, Renal and
Nephrology News (Apr. 2, 2009), http://www.renalandurologynews.com/veterans-affairshospital-affected-by-emr-glitches/ article/129987/# (software bugs impair patient care).
95. See Belletti, supra note 93, at 31; see also Ackerman, supra note 92. One of the
major limitations to wide spread adoption of the PCMH model is that few PCPs have access
to EMRs. See Paul Grundy et al., The Multi-Stakeholder Movement for Primary Care
Renewal and Reform, 29 Health Aff. 791, 793 (May 2010) (in 2009, less than half of PCPs
had EMRs in their offices). To improve EMR penetration, the HITECH Act (part of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009) created EMR adoption incentive for
providers who made "meaningful use" of EMRs. See Ackerman, supra note 92.
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2. Societal Benefits of the PCMH
Advocates of the PCMH like to point out that it improves outcomes and
reduces costs. 9 6 In actuality, improved outcomes and reduced costs are two
sides of the same coin: improving outcomes alleviates the need to provide
costly remedial care. 97 While the data coming out of PCMH pilot projects
is not universally favorable, 98 the better-managed PCMHs have
demonstrated that they can provide higher quality care than traditional
primary care clinics, 99 while improving their capacity to handle patients.fo
Another study found that after adopting the PCMH model to provide
primary care services, seven major health care providers were able to
decrease their patient hospitalization rate by five percent to forty percent,
and reduce emergency room (ER) visits by zero percent to twenty-nine
percent, thereby allowing these organizations to save from $71 per patient
to $640 per patient.o Similarly, Group Health generated a return of $1.50
for every dollar it invested in its PCMH project, while it simultaneously
improved both patient and physician satisfaction. 10 2
So, if these early favorable results for PCMH primary care delivery can
96. See Daniel Field, Elizabeth Leshen & Kavita Patel, Driving Quality and Cost
Savings Through Adoption ofMedical Homes, 29 Health Aff. 819, 823 (2010).
97. See generally Inst. of Med., To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System
(Linda T. Kohn et al. Eds., 2000) [hereinafter IOM]. The physician cult-classic The House
of God repeatedly points out the advantages that iatrogenic injuries arising in the course of
providing unnecessary care have on physicians' income. Samuel Shem, The House of God
(Dell Publishing Co., 1978).
98. See Casalino, supra note 68, at 789; see also Kilo, supra note 69, at 776
(commentators in the trenches of system redesign are aware that there are limited data in
favor of the PCMH and consequently the PCMH is at "risk of becoming the latest fad in a
long history of unrealistic expectations and failed health reform efforts.").
99. See Landon, supra note 73, at 828-29. What constitutes "quality" in health care is
very difficult to define. See id (observing that there are no widely accepted metrics of
measuring the quality of PCMHs); see also Eric S. Holmboe, Gerald K. Arnold, Welfeng
Weng & Rebecca Lipner, Current Yardsticks May Be Inadequate for Measuring Quality
Improvement From the Medical Home, 29 Health Aff. 859, 859 (2010) (questioning the
validity of structural performance measures to identify quality). However, most of us can
agree that a treatment regimen that keeps patients out of emergency rooms and hospitals
would represent an improvement in care quality even if precise quantization of that
improvement is difficult.
100. Cf Margolius & Bodenheimer, supra note 68, at 779-80 (observing that the limited
size of "concierge" primary care panels allows for physicians to provide high-quality
medical care, but the concierge model for primary care does not improve the nation's access
to care); Casalino, supra note 68, at 789 (lacking a team approach to hold down unit costs,
few patients can afford concierge primary care services).
101. Field, supra note 96, at 823.
102. Robert J. Reid et al., The Group Health Medical Home at Year Two: Cost Saving,
Higher Patient Satisfaction, and Less Burnout for Providers, 29 Health Aff. 835, 836-39
(2010) (describing how over a two-year period, patients rated care from the PCMH higher
than traditionally-provided care while the rate of burnout among physicians was significantly
less).
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be replicated on a larger scale,o 3 the potential monetary benefits associated
with the PCMH could be significant. This is because in the United States,
one of the primary drivers for the consumption of ER services is a lack of
access to primary care providers. 104 For instance, for patients with diabetes,
asthma, and other conditions, ER treatments are twice as frequent in the
U.S. as they are in the European Union. 05 As a result, the increased
capacity of PCMHs to monitor and modulate outpatients goes a long way to
avoiding expensive trips to the ER.
C. PEs and Economic Schizophrenia
On the other hand, there are, downsides to the PCMH. In addition to the
fact that the PCMH delivery of primary care service may not be superior to
traditionally delivered primary care services, there is the issue of PE/PCMH
schizophrenia to be considered. Before examining PE legal concerns, it is
06
necessary to pause to consider two forms of economic schizophrenia'
related to PEs and PCMH.
The first form of schizophrenia is manifested by the American Medical
Association (AMA). It is axiomatic that the liberalization of the PE scope
of practice' 0 7 would threaten the livelihoods of the AMA's members. So, it
should come as no surprise that the AMA is on record as opposing the
liberalization of scope of practice for PEs. 0 8 In the case of the PCMH, the
AMA is quick to find fault, claiming that:
quality gains were modest, and the [pilot] project created no positive
103. Benjamin J. Chesluk & Eric S. Holmboe, How Teams Work - Or Don't - In
Primary Care:A FieldStudy on InternalMedicine Practices,29 Health Aff. 874, 878 (2010)
(implying, in the context of this thematic issue, that the editors of Health Affairs believe that
the concept of a medical team must evolve if the PCMH is to succeed); Landon, supra note
73, at 829 (discussing the significant barriers to large scale adoption of the PCMH).
104. Bodenheimer & Pham, supra note 66, at 801. Many commentators imply that a
shortage of PCPs is a key reason for a lack of access to primary care services in the United
States. Id. at 800. To a degree this is a true statement. However, this assertion neglects the
fact that to become a board-certified specialist in many fields (e.g., cardiology,
gastroenterology, and pulmonologist) the doctor must be first certified in the primary care
field of internal medicine. If health care reform should continue to reduce the number of
specialists that are needed, the United States may actually have a surplus of primary care
providers if these specialists elect to de-specialize and deliver primary care in order to
continue working. See, e.g., Thomas R. McLean, In New York State, Do More Percutaneous
CoronaryInterventions Mean Fewer or More Complex Referrals to Cardiac Surgeons?, 6
Am. Heart Hosp. J. 30, 35 (2008) [hereinafter PercutaneousCoronaryInterventions].
105. Grundy, supra note 95, at 791.
106. Recall that as used in this paper schizophrenia is being used colloquially in this
article to refer to the brain's capacity to hold seemingly contradictory ideas.
107. See infra, Part IlI, Section A.
108. Amy Lynn Sorrel, Organized Medicine Pushes Back on Expansions of Scope of
Practice, Am. Med. News, Jan. 25. 2010, at 1, available at http://www.amaassn.org/amednews/2010/01/18/prl2Ol18.htm.
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movement on patients' ratings of their own care, researchers found. The
project also revealed that successful transformation to a patient-centered
medical home "requires a great deal of effort, motivation and support." . . .
[Of the t]hirty-six family medicine practices were chosen to participate in
the project, . . . five dropped out before the end of the two years.109
On the other hand, the AMA's credibility is on the line. If the AMA
allows itself the luxury of being tied too-tightly to the traditional model of
primary care delivery, than the AMA risks losing credibility because the
traditional system has clearly failed to meet our health care needs.
Consequently, the AMA has taken a split-minded view of the PCMH by
indicating that it is willing to work "collaboratively with other
organizations to bring substantive improvements to medical education
across the continuum that will enhance both physician and health system
performance."'" 0 As both of the AMA's statements concerning the PCMH
were made in 2010, it remains to be seen how the AMA will resolves the
inconsistencies between these statements.
The second form of schizophrenia concerns the call for equal pay.
Regardless of training, if two employees provide exactly the same service,
then they should each receive the same pay."' Unfortunately, while some
isolated exceptions may exist, the general rule in this country is that PEs
and physicians do not provide exactly the same service.1 2 The Supreme
Court of Tennessee has observed that the idea that "care rendered by the
average physician is the same as the care rendered by the average physician
extender is, at best, na've."" 3 Moreover, if PEs and physicians provided
identical quality of care, consider the societal implications:"14
109. Chris Silva, MedicalHome Demo Reports Some Positive Outcomes - With Caveats,
http://www.amaat
available
2010),
21,
(June
AMedNews.com
assn.org/amednews/2010/06/2 1/gvsa062 1.htm.
110. Report 8 of the Report of the Council on Medical Education. Am. Med. Ass'n, June
21, 2010, at 1, http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub
/upload/mm/377/cme-rep8-al0.pdf; see also Muroff; supra note 31, at 154-55.
111. See generally EqualPay Act of 1963, 29 US.C. § 206(d) (2006).
112. Herein we will ignore the schizophrenia by which the federal reimbursement
policies do not treat all physicians the same. Jay Parkinson, All PhysiciansAre Not Created
Equal: How to Fix Medicine's Two-Party System, Fast Company (Apr. 30, 2009),
http://www.fastcompany.com/blog/jay-parkinson/hello-health/all-physicians-are-not-createdequal.
113. McLean, supra note 3, at 260 (quoted in Cox v. M.A. Primary and Urgent Care
Clinic, 313 S.W.3d 240, 258 (2010)). Under certain limited conditions PEs do provide
substantial similar care. When these conditions prevail, PEs should receive the same
compensation as physicians. See infra, Part III, Section B.
114. See generally Robyn E. Marsh, The Health Care Industry and Its Medical Care
Providers: Relationship of Trust or Antitrust?, 8 Depaul Bus. & Com. L.J. 251 (2010)
(discussing antitrust issues between PEs and physicians as an important societal issue); Inst.
of Med. & Robert Wood Johnson Found., The Future of Nursing: Leading Change,
Advancing Health S4 (2010) [hereinafter IOM/RWJF] (advancing antitrust issues as an
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[S]ociety would no longer have any incentive to provide health care
education beyond the masters degree level; and second, there would be no
incentive for individuals to invest in the additional years required to become
a physician. Moreover, to conclude the quality of the work product of a
physician extender is the same as a physician's work product would be
analogous to asserting that the quality of the work product of a paralegal is
same as an attorney's work product."'
Yet, here is where the schizophrenia enters the discussion. When the
Institute of Medicine (IOM), the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
(RWJF),1 16 and other commentators,"' have called for equal pay for PEs
and physicians, it is likely that apples and oranges were being compared.
This is because the IOM and RWJF want PEs, especially NPs, to evolve to
become something very close to what we know today as PCPs. More
specifically, the IOM and RWJF want the number of nurses with doctorate
degrees to double by 2020;118 and for all NPs to receive post-graduate
medical training (i.e., residency training) similar to physicians.119 The
talisman of such additional post-graduate medical training for NPs that is
certified by a specialty board would then place PEs on an intellectual par
with board-certificated physicians. 12 0 If the IOM and RWJF do succeed in
ramping up the education requirements for PEs to the post-graduate level as
argument for liberalizing the scope of practice for PEs); Letter from Maureen K. Ohlhausen,
Dir., Office of Policy Planning, Fed. Trade Comm'n et al. to Elaine Nekritz, Illinois State
Representative,
(May
29,
2008);
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008
/06/VO800113letter.pdf. A detailed discussion of antitrust issues in healthcare are beyond
the scope of this article.
115. McLean, supra note 3, at 261.
116. IOM/RWJF, supra note 114, at S6-S7 (calling for nurses to become full partners
with physicians and other health professionals in redesigning American healthcare).
117. Carla Mills, Nurse Practitioners-ValuableBut Undervalued, Nurse Practitioner
World News (May 2010), http://www.npworldnews.com
/columns/details/nurse-practionersvaluable-but-undervalued; Beck-Wilson v. Principi, 441
F.3d 353, 358 (6th Cir. 2005) (The Department of Veterans Affairs pay scale, for a time,
appears to have provided NPs and PAs with different reimbursements for providing the same
service).
118. IOM/RWJF, supra note 114, at Sli. Whether we have the capacity in our
educational system to achieve this goal is questionable. See, e.g., McLean, supra note 3, at
260. Since the IOM first recommended increasing the number of NPs in our health care
system in 1999 (see generally IOM, supra note 97) the increase in NPs has been a modest
seventeen percent (see infra, Part III, Section C, Subsection 2).
119. IOM/RWJF, supra note 114, at S4.
120. Board Certification of Nurses Makes a Difference, Am. Nurse Credentialing Ctr.,
http://www. nursecredentialing.org (last visited Apr. 30, 2011) (showing board certification
for NPs already exists); Family Nurse PractitionerCertification Eligibility Criteria, Am.
Nurse Credentialing Ctr., http://www.nurse credentialing.org/Eligibility
/FamilyNPEligibility.aspx (last visited Apr. 30, 2011) (explaining NP board certification
currently only requires a licensed NP to pass an examination even if the NP has no formal
post-graduate training).

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol20/iss2/5

18

McLean: The Schizophrenia of Physician Extender Utilization

2011]

Schizophrenia of Physician Extender Utilization

223

a condition to enter the market, NPs will become fungible with PCPs.
One more piece of split-mindedness: if NPs become fungible with PCPs
and demand equal pay, why won't the NPs ask for PCP pay? After all,
when low-income providers hear that they will receive the same wages as
high-income providers for the same services, it is natural for the lowincome providers to expect an increase in their compensation. But raising
PE compensation above its current level will only drive up the cost of
health care and make the PCMH less cost effective.121 So, in reality, if we
as a society wish to control the cost of healthcare and provide equal pay to
doctorate-level PEs with board certification and board-certified PCPs (a
case of apples compared to apples), then we as a society are more likely to
reduce PCPs compensation to the current compensation level for PEs.
III. TRADITIONAL LEGAL METHODS OF REGULATION
Forgetting about PE economic schizophrenia,122 how should society
regulate PEs in their expanded roles as primary health care providers in the
RMCs and the PCMHs? Using a traditional legal approach, this section
examines three key PE regulatory mechanisms: the legislatively determined
scope of practice, the judicially determined standard of care, and who pays
when a PE deviates from the standard of care (i.e., PE medical malpractice
liability). 123
A. Scope ofPractice
For both PEs and physicians, the privilege of practicing their professions
requires a state license.124 Yet, state professional licenses are not an
121. The substitution of low-waged PEs for high-waged physicians is a key argument
for why the PCMH helps to drive down America's health care costs. See supra footnotes
86-91 and the related text.
122. Ignoring economic schizophrenia in health care market is reasonable because an
expanded role for PEs is virtual certainty. Having studied the IOM for more than a decade,
it is clear that what IOM recommends (see, e.g., IOM/RWJF, supra note 114) is almost
always adopted by the federal government as its health care policy.
123. PE medical malpractice liability may involve issues of personal immunity when a
claim is filed against federal government (see, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1346 (2011)) or state governmental agencies (e.g. Sermchief v. Gonzales, 660 S.W.2d 683,
687 (Mo. 1983); Letter from the Dep't. of Health & Human Serv. to Health Ctr. Program
Grantees (Aug. 22, 2007), http://bphc.hrsa.gov/policiesregulations/policies/pin2007l6.html).
PEs employed by clinics that are supported by federal "330 grants" also receive personal
immunity from medical malpractice liability under the Federal Torts Claim Act. However, a
detailed discussion of PE immunity is beyond the scope of this article.
124. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 114 (1889); McLean, supra note 3, at 245. A
detailed discussion of the theory and practice of medical licensure and scope of practice acts
are beyond the scope of this article. Interested readers should consult McLean, supra note 3,
and Edward P. Richards, The Police Power and the Regulation of Medical Practice: A
Historical Review and Guide for Medical Licensing Board Regulation of Physicians in
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unrestricted grant to practice one's profession. 12 5 Rather, under state scope
of practice laws, both PEs and physicians are restricted (and occasionally
prohibited) from providing certain medical services.126 For example, as
most individuals are aware, scope of practice laws limit physicians with
respect to performing abortions, 2 prescribing (narcotic) medications,12 s
and other less commonly discussed services. 129
For PEs, the pivotal scope of practice restrictions concern professional
autonomy. Restrictions on PEs' autonomy to practice arise under both the
physician licensure statutes and the PE licensure statutes.13 0 In addition to
authorizing physicians to supervise PEs, physician medical licensure
statutes generally place two key limitations on a PE's autonomy. First,
proper physician supervision of a PE is conditioned on the existence of a
written "collaborative" agreement. 31 The collaborative agreement between
a physician and PE defines what services a physician delegates to a PE and
thereby acts as the operating agreement that governs the physician-PE
relationship. 13 2 Second, physician licensure statutes provide authorization
for physicians to be disciplined in the event they fail to properly supervise
their PE associates.13 3 Indeed, in some states, supervising physicians have
an affirmative duty to report PEs who habitually fail to honor their

ERISA-Qualified Managed Care Organizations,8 Annals Health L. 201 (1999).
125. Cox v. M.A. Primary & Urgent Care Clinic, 313 S.W.3d 240, 250 (Tenn. 2010).
126. McLean, supra note 3, at 247-48. An analogous situation occurs when a state
issues a driver's license. The holder of driver's license does not receive an unrestricted grant
to drive any motor vehicle. Rather the holder of a driver's license has her scope of driving
practice limited (typically) to driving non-commercial vehicles.
127. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973); Griswald v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 480 (1965).
128. See generally Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664-65 (1962); Minnesota ex
rel. Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41, 46 (1921).
129. Providing certain treatments is restricted unless statutory disclosures have been
made to the patient. See, e.g., Mike Stokes, New York Passes Law MandatingDisclosure of
Breast Reconstruction Options, Plastic Surgery News Extra (Aug. 19, 2010),
http://psnextra.org/Articles/Breast-Recon-Law.html (reporting that beginning Jan. 1, 2011,
surgeons in New York State must discuss reconstruction options with female patients prior
to performing a mastectomy).
130. State ex. rel Howenstine v. Roper, 155 S.W.3d 747, 750 (Mo. 2005). In some
states the same Board of Medical Examiners may set the rules and regulations for both PEs
See Kan. Bd. of Healing Arts Rules and Regulations (2010),
and physicians.
http://www.ksbha.org/regs.html (PA and MDs have same oversight board); cf Kan. Bd. of
Nursing, Nurse Practice Act Statues and Administrative Regulations (2010), available at
http://www.ksbn.org/npa/npa.pdf. (NPs have an independent state oversight board).
131. See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 2069(a)(2) (2010). A collaborative agreement
creates the outer boundary of a PE treatment protocol.
132. Howenstine, 155 S.W.3d at 751. This collaborative agreement may also constitute
evidence that the physician and PE have an agency relationship. See infra, Section Il.A.
133. See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 2069(c).

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol20/iss2/5

20

McLean: The Schizophrenia of Physician Extender Utilization

2011]

Schizophrenia of Physician Extender Utilization

225

collaborative agreements.134
PE professional licensing boards, on the other hand, define what level of
supervision a PE must have, and what services a PE may provide. As these
regulations are state and provider specific, 135 and PE professional
organizations have websites that provide detailed summaries of the fifty
states' scope of practice regulation,13 6 a comprehensive discussion of PE
scope of practice acts is beyond the scope of this article.
However, it is worth noting that PE scope of practice regulations have
many items in common, for instance, the services a physician delegates to a
PE may not exceed the scope of the physician's own practice.137
Additionally, while PEs must be supervised or collaborate with a
physician, 38 when the PE renders medical care to a patient, physical
proximity between the physician and PE is not mandatory.13 9 Rather, a
supervising physician needs only to be available (by telephone) for
consultation during PE care giving. Finally, physician supervisors must
occasionally review the PE documentation.140
From a regulatory perspective, licensure and scope of practice laws
influence PE practices in two ways. First, non-compliance with licensure
and scope of practice statutes can expose both PEs and their physician
supervisors to professional discipline,14' as well as medical malpractice
liability.142 As licensure and scope of practice statutes limited PEs'
134. Moreno v. Quintana, 324 S.W.3d 124, 134 (Tex. App. 2010).
135. Schleiter, supra note 40, at 549. Due to differences and training and their historic
relationships with physicians, the scope of practice that a state grants to NPs and PAs is not
identical. See infra, this Section.
136. See, e.g., State Laws and Regulations, Am. Acad. of Physician Assistants (2010),
http://www.aapa.org/for-employers/state-laws-and-regulations. The American Academy of
Physician Assistants provides a state-by-state summary of state regulations relating to PAs;
Sharon Christian et al., Chart Overview of Nurse PractitionerScopes of Practice in the
United States, Ctr. for the Health Professions Univ. of Cal., San Francisco (2007),
http://www.health.state.mn.us/healthreform/workforce/npcomparison.pdf.
137. Petzel v. Valley Orthopedics, 770 N.W.2d 787, 793 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009).
138. Lauren E. Battaglia, Supervision and Collaboration Requirements: The
Vulnerability of Nurse Practitionersand Its Implicationsfor Retail Health, 87 Wash. U. L.
Rev. 1127, 1137 (2010); cf, Muroff, supra note 31, at 159 (observing that in 2008 about
twenty percent of states allowed NPs the luxury of practicing autonomously).
139. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 2069(a)(2) (2010); Sermchief v. Gonzales, 660
S.W.2d 683, 689 (Mo. 1983); Marchisotto v. Williams, 2006 WL 1152576, at *5 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2006).
140. Yarnell Beatty, Retail-Based Clinic Oversight Draws TMA's Attention, 100 1
Tenn. Med. Ass'n 16, 16 (2007). See also Battaglia, supra note 138, at 1138.
141. See, e.g., THI of Texas v. Perea, 329 S.W.3d 548, 560 (Tex. App. 2010) (showing a
PE who goes "rouge" by providing services outside of their scope of practice may be
discipline by the appropriate state board (this case actually concerns a registered nurse, and
not a NP)).
142. See generally Cent. Anesthesia Assoc. v. Worthy, 333 S.E.2d 829 (Ga. 1985)
(where a scope of practice statute was used to establish negligence per se).
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autonomy and are state specific, these regulations have also established a
"race to the bottom." That is, to gain maximum autonomy, PEs migrate
from high to low restrictive scope of practices states. 143 Not surprisingly, to
stem such migration, health care reformers are encouraging the adoption of
a national scope of practice statue for PEs.'"
B. Standardof Care
The judicially determined standard of care for PEs practicing in RMCs
and PMCMs raises three issues: what is the standard care, how is the
standard established, and whether a physician supervisor accrues vicarious
liability for the negligent care provided by a subordinate PE.
1. What is the Standard of Care for PEs?
To prevail in a medical malpractice action against a PE, a plaintiff must
demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the care rendered by
the PE "was not in accordance with the standards of practice among
members of the same health care profession with similar training and
experience situated in the same or similar communities at the time of the
alleged act giving rise to the cause of action. 145 Thus, the standard of care
in PE medical malpractice action has two elements: one element concerns
the locality of where the care is given, and the other element concerns how
a similarly trained professional would handle the situation.
2. Locality Rule
The locality rule first appeared during debates over whether a national or
local yardstick should be used to measure a PE's (or a physician's) clinical
performance. Many medical practices are uniform across the country.14 6
For example, regardless of whether a hospital is located in a rural region or
a major metropolitan area, the performance of a "time out" prior to the
commencement of surgical procedure to verify the scope of the operation is
a nearly universally accepted medical practice.147 Thus, for medical
143. Mary D. Naylor & Ellen T. Kurtzman, The Role of Nurse Practitioners in
Reinventing Primary Care.29 Health Aff. 893, 896 (2010).
144. Id. at 896-97. A call for a national licensure/scope of practice act defining PE
services can be traced to the beginning of the patient safety movement. See, McLean, supra
note 3, at 251 (citing Comm. on Quality of Health Care in Am., Inst. of Med., Crossing the
Quality Chasm: A New Health Ststem for the 21st Century, 1 (2001)).
145. Langwell v. Albemarle Family Practice, 692 S.E.2d 476, 480 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010)
(citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.12 (2007)); see generally, Cox v. Bd. of Hosp. Managers,
651 N.W.2d 356 (Mich. 2002).
146. Uniformity of a medical practice is the concept behind evidence-based medicine (a
topic beyond the scope of this article).
147. See generally John D. Birkmeyer, Strategies for Improving Surgical Quality -
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practices that are uniform across the country, the use of a national yardstick
(i.e., a national standard of care) to measure a PE's clinical performance
would be appropriate. Indeed, twenty-nine states and the District of
Columbia have adopted a national standard of care to judge the clinical
performance of their health care providers. 4 In such national standard of
care jurisdictions, an expert witness from anywhere in the country may
testify at trial to set the standard of care, as long as the expert practices in
the same field as the defendant. 14 9
Alternatively, a minority of jurisdictions have adopted a locality rule to
assess the clinical performance of their health care providers and to protect
their scarce "human capital" medical resources. Indeed:
[t]he character of the locality or neighborhood in which a physician
[extender] practices has an important bearing on the requisite degree of skill
and care that is required of him, in view of the difference in opportunities,
experience, and conditions of practice between densely and sparsely
populated communities. As the physician engages to bring to bear upon the
case only such skill and care as are ordinarily practiced by others of the
same profession in a like situation, some cases, particularly earlier ones, in
adopting the so-called "[locality rule]" require that a physician [extender]
be held only to that degree of diligence, learning, and skill possessed by
physicians and surgeons of the particular locality where he practices.s 0
Accordingly, in locality rule jurisdictions, expert witness testimony is
limited. Expert witnesses may testify at trial only if one of two conditions
exists: the witness practices in same community as the defendant provider,
or the expert can demonstrate that they have "specialized knowledge""' of
what it is like to practice medicine in a community comparable to the one
where the defendant practices.152 Expert witnesses lacking one of these
Checklists andBeyond, 363 N. Eng. J. Med. 1963 (2010).
148. C. Jerry Willis, Establishing Standards of Care: Locality Rules or National
Standards, AAOS Now (Feb. 2009), http://www.aaos.org/news/aaosnow
/feb09/managing9.asp; cf Letter from Edward P. Richards, La. St. U. Professor of Law, to
author (Dec. 10, 2010) (on file with author) (when procedural techniques are included,
functional all 50 states have a locality rule to some degree).
149. Cardenas v. Muangman, 998 A.2d 303, 306, 308 (D.C. 2010) (comprehensively
reviewing the rules applicable to an expert witness testifying on the national standard of
care, the court focuses on the expert foundation, and not where the expert's home is located).
150. 61 Am. Jur. 2d Physicians,Surgeons, & Other Healers § 200 (2002).
151. This term will be expanded upon in a few paragraphs during the discussion of
cross-over witnesses.
152. Heitman v. Christus Health Cent., 49 So.3d 609, 612 (La. Ct. App. 2010); Land v.
Barnes, No. M2008-00191-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 4254155, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 10,
2008); Siegel v. Husak, 943 So.2d 209, 215-16 (FL 2006) (Gersten, J., concurring); Shane v.
Blair, 75 P.3d 180, 183 (Idaho 2003); Cox v. Bd. of Hosp. Managers, 651 N.W.2d 356, 380
(Mich. 2002). Cf. Mosley v. Owens, 816 P.2d 1198, 1201-02 (Or. Ct. App. 1991)
("Oregon's 'locality rule' does not preclude the possibility that certain standards of care are
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qualifications will fatally injure their client's ability to prevail at trial. 53
While these rules apply equally to plaintiffs and defendants, in actual
operation, the locality rule has a disproportionately negative impact on
plaintiffs. The reason is peer pressure. Physicians and PEs do not
appreciate their communal colleagues who testify against them, whereas
physicians and PEs laud their communal colleagues who testify on their
behalf. Human nature, of course, dictates that economic consequences will
follow a provider's reputation. As no one wants to be shunned, communal
providers tend not to testify against their brethren. Thus, the locality rule
disproportionately impairs a plaintiff s ability to secure PE expert testimony
even more so than it does a plaintiffs ability to secure physician expert
witness testimony. The scarcity of PEs - compared with the 800,000
physicians in the United States,' 5 4 there are only about a quarter as many
PEs' 55 - means that with the exception of major metropolitan areas,
plaintiffs are unlikely to find PEs willing to testify on their behalf in locality
rule jurisdictions.
3. The Expert Witness' Experience
The second element for setting the standard of care, the expert witnesses'
training and experience, may compound the scarcity of potential PE expert
witnesses in medical malpractice actions if the expert witness must be
strictly from the same school of practice as the defendant.15 6
Setting the standard of care in PE medical malpractice cases usually
begins with the filing of an affidavit of merit.'57 This document, signed by
the plaintiffs expert witness, contains statements of the expert witness'
experience, the applicable standard of care, and how the defendant PE
breached that standard.' 58 In order to sign an affidavit of merit, the
plaintiffs expert must be someone who spends the majority of their
professional time (during the past twelve months), practicing in the same
uniform throughout the nation.").
153. See Land,2008 WL 4254155 at *1.
154. Dennis Cauchon, Medical Miscalculation Creates Doctor Shortage, USA Today
(Mar. 2, 2005, 5:13 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2005-03-02-doctorshortagex.htm.
155. See supra,note 66.
156. The Expert's Role In Establishing Medical Malpractice Case Standards, The
http://www.lectlaw.com/files/exp23.htm ("The school of practice
'Lectric 1. Lib.,
distinctions also predated modem medical training and certification. At one time medical
practitioners were divided into chiropractors, homeopaths, allopaths, osteopaths, and several
other schools based on different philosophical and psychological beliefs.... The courts
retain the traditional school of practice rule when they refuse to allow physician experts to
question chiropractic care or chiropractors to testify in cases with physician defendants.").
157. McElhaney v. Harper-Hutzel Hosp., 711 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
158. Id.
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school as the defendant.159
But what exactly is the PE standard of care? In a professional negligence
action against a PE, the expert witness must testify to what a reasonable PE
would have done under the same or similar circumstances.16 o Implicit in
this definition of the standard of care is the contemplation of a PE's formal
training and experience. As PEs are not as well trained as physicians, a
corollary to PE standard of care is that this standard is not the same as
physicians' standard of care.16 1 This view is in accordance with the view
applied to chiropractors1 62 and podiatrists, 16 3 who are trained in a different
school of practice than physicians and are judged by a standard of care that
is different from the standard of care applied to physicians.
Thus, as a general rule, because only members of same school of practice
can set the standard of care, only physicians can set the standard of care
against a physician, and only PEs can set the standard of care against a
PE.16 4 Yet, this general rule has an important exception. The courts do "not
require that the expert practice the same profession or specialty as the
defendant, 'so long as the expert had a sufficient basis on which to establish
familiarity with the defendant's field of practice and the standard of care
required in dealing with the medical care at issue.'" 6 5
Under this "cross-over" exception, an expert witness may testify against
a provider form another school of practice if that expert provides a
substantially similar or an overlapping service. That is, an expert can
provide cross-over testimony when "the expert had obtained knowledge
about the applicable standard of care through experience and training." 6 6
Accordingly, a gynecologist has been allowed to set the standard of care for

159. Id. at 798. See also Slaggart v. Mich. Cardiovascular Inst., No. 269776, 2006 WL
1867245, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. July 6, 2006) (holding that an attorney should only accept an
affidavit of merit when the attorney has a reasonable belief the signatory will qualify as an
expert witness).
160. Fein v. Permanente Med. Grp., 695 P.2d 665,673 n.4 (Cal. 1985).
161. Cox v. M.A. Primary & Urgent Care Clinic, 313 S.W.3d 240, 257 (Tenn. 2010).
162. Brodersen v. Sioux Valley Mem'l Hosp., 902 F.Supp. 931, 951 (N.D. Iowa 1995);
but cf. Group v. Vicento, 164 S.W.3d 724, 732-34 (Tex.App. 2005) (allowing a physician to
testify against a chiropractor).
163. Foster v. Zavala, 214 S.W.3d 106, 114 (Tex. App. 2006) (holding that a
cardiovascular surgeon does not practice in the same field as a podiatrist).
164. Because courts are "vested with great discretion in determining the competence of
expert witnesses," their decisions are rarely overturned on appeal. Heitman v. Christus
Health Cent., 49 So.3d 609, 611 (La. Ct. App. 2010).
165. Land v. Barnes, No. M2008-00191-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 4254155, at *4 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2008) (quoting Bravo v. Sumner Reg'1 Health Sys., 148 S.W.3d 357, 367
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)).
166. "Cross-Over" Expert Testimony in Medical MalpracticeActions, 30 Med. Liability
Rep. 180, 180 (2008) (this article provides a summary of the state-to-state variations on
cross-over witnesses) [hereinafter "Cross-Over"].
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the insertion of a contraceptive device against a NP,'67 and a cardiologist
has been allowed to set the standard of care against a PA practicing in the

field of cardiology.168
For PEs, the concept of school of practice determined standard of care is
being undermined in another important way. An argument is being
circulated that the standard of care for PEs and physicians should be the
same.169 Unfortunately, this argument has two detractors. First, this
argument creates a slippery slope. Consider a situation where a physician is
allowed to set the standard of care against a PE. Unless the testifying
physician wrote, or has knowledge of, the collaborative agreement signed
by the PE, the physician's testimony may incorporate personal bias. For
example, having observed PEs for number of years, a physician may
assume that a PE's training covers certain subject matter. This assumption
may or may not be true. So, if a physician provides cross-over expert
witness testimony against a PE, the physician may unconsciously testify to
a higher PE standard of care than would be justified based on a PE's actual
training and experience. 170
Second, holding PEs and physicians to the same standard of care for
providing substantially similar services assumes apples are being compared
to apples. Again this assumption may or may not be true. In a situation
where a single medical service is delivered to a patient without

167. Planned Parenthood of N.W. Ind. v. Vines, 543 N.E.2d 654, 660 (Ind. Ct. App.
1989). But cf McElhaney v. Harper-Hutzel Hosp., 711 N.W.2d 795, 800-01 (Mich. Ct. App.
2005) (obstetrician was not allow to set the standard of care for delivery against a midwife);
Simonson v. Keppard, 225 S.W.3d 868, 873-74 (Tex. App. 2007) (holding a neurosurgeon
with emergency room experience was not qualified to render opinion regarding standard of
care governing nurse practitioner accused of failing to diagnose massive intracranial
hemorrhage in emergency room patient).
168. In re Stacy K. Boone, P.A., 223 S.W.3d 398, 404 (Tex. App. 2006). Cf CrossOver, supra note 166, at 182 (citing Wolford v. Duncan, 760 N.W.2d 253 (Mich. Ct. App.
2008), which held a "physician's assistant whose supervising physician specialized in
internal medicine was qualified to render opinion regarding conduct of physician's assistant
whose supervising physician specialized in family practice"); see Wilson v. James, No. 07C04-025, 2010 WL 1107301, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 2010) (stating, "This is not a case
in which the plaintiffs proffered expert has articulated an opinion that merely conflicts with
that offered by the defendant's expert; Dr. Bauchner's report and deposition fail to express
any standard of care for a physician's assistant, and further make clear that he would be
unqualified to do so."); see Cross-Over, supra note 166, at 186 (citing Cristescu v.
McGowan, No. A06-2455, 2007 WL 4110901 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2007) which held a
"malpractice claimant who worked as dentist in Rumania and as dental hygienist and dental
assistant in United States was not qualified to execute affidavit of merit regarding standard
of care governing dentist who performed restorative work.").
169. See Janette A. Bertness, Rhode Island Nurse Practitioners:Are They Legally
PracticingMedicine Without a License?, 14 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 215, 215-17 (2009).
170. The risk of such tainted testimony would need to be weighed against denying a
worthy plaintiff their day in court.
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For
compounding co-morbid conditions, this assumption is true.17
presents
to
child
example, consider a situation where a healthy ten-year-old
an RMC with the new onset of symptoms consistent with that of a common
cold. Regardless of whether the child is evaluated by a PE or a physician,
the medical decision-making will be the same. Indeed, as the child has no
co-morbid conditions and the only variable that requires analysis is the new
symptoms, the medical calculus is entirely linear. In this situation one
would expect a PE and physician to arrive at the same diagnosis and
treatment plan. In this situation, where apples are being compared to
apples, holding PEs and physicians to same standard of care is reasonable.
On the other hand, consider a situation where the medical calculus in
non-linear. For example, consider the situation where an elderly patient,
with multiple co-morbid medical conditions, presents to a PCMH for the
treatment of her glaucoma.172 Prior to treating the patient's glaucoma,
clinical judgment must be exercised to determine which subtype of
glaucoma the patient has and how all of the patient's co-morbid conditions
may be impacted by any proposed treatment (because glaucoma
medications can have systemic side-effects). 173 With more years of formal
post-graduate training in medical decision-making, physicians are in a
better position than PEs to evaluate a glaucoma patient's risks-to-benefit
ratio when selecting a treatment regimen. 17 4 Conversely, it is not surprising
that, when PEs have been allowed to manage complex patients with
glaucoma, the PEs' lack of clinical acumen translated into a significant
number of patients' glaucoma progressing to complete blindness. 17 5
In short, as either the number of co-morbid medical conditions increases
or the number of subtypes of a specific condition has any clinical
comparison of PEs and physicians, with respect to standard of care given,
will increasingly resemble a comparison of apples and oranges.
Consequently, as a patient's health care needs become increasingly
complex, it becomes increasingly inappropriate to hold a PE to a
physician's standard of care.
Now, let's consider a related issue: Can a NP provide cross-over
testimony against a PA? For example, assume that a NP mismanages a
patient with multiple medical conditions and the patient subsequently dies.
The patient's survivors bring a wrongful death action against the NP based
on affidavits of merits signed by a physician and PA. Assume further that
171. See McLean, supra note 3, at 261 n.119.
172. See Maa & Hedstrom, supra note 12.
173. Treating Glaucoma, Glaucoma Research Found., http://www.glaucoma.org/treating
/medication.php (last visited Apr. 30, 2011).
174. See McLean, supra note 3.
175. Whether the physician provided negligent supervision is a separate issue that will
be addressed in more detail shortly; see infra, Part III, Section C.
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the trial court invoked the locality rule to find the plaintiffs physician
incompetent to serve as an expert witness for providing cross-over witness
testimony. Under these conditions, can or should a PA be allowed to
provide cross-over testimony against a NP?
According to the Land court, 1 6 the first legal opinion to address the issue
of whether NP and PA schools of practice can provide cross-over expert
witness testimony, the answer is "no." In Land, which affirmed the trial
court ruling that the plaintiffs physician expert witness was incompetent to
testify under the state's locality rule, 17 7 the court considered the
appropriateness of allowing a PA to set the standard of care against a NP.
In part, the Tennessee appellate court's decision to affirming the trial
court's decision to disqualify the PA expert witness was also based on
locality rule considerations. 7 8 Yet, the court went on to add a quote from
the trial court judge who stated, "I do not see how he could address the
issue of breach of the standard of care if he really doesn't know what the
parameters are within which nurse practitioners work. He's not familiar
with the medications that were given." 79
Land did not elaborate on this comment. Implicit in court's comment,
however, is that PAs and NPs come from different schools of practice.
While it is true that the formal education of PAs, NPs, and other PEs are
similar, 18 the content and rigors of the specific forms of PE training are
different and attract different types of individuals. 8 1 Thus, PAs and NPs
may manage substantially similar situations differently. Such differences in
experience and training may explain why the Land plaintiffs PA expert
witness was not familiar with the medications selected by the defendant NP
to manage the decedent's hypertension. 182
Yet, if Land is adopted widely, its school of practice specificity
requirements for PE expert witness testimony may further limit the
plaintiffs' ability to set the standard of care. This reason is that Land bars
PEs from being cross-over witnesses against one another. Just as
chiropractors and podiatrist are barred from providing cross-over testimony
against physicians because these providers come from different schools of

176. Land v. Barnes, No. M2008-00191-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 4254155 at *1, *6
(Tenn. Ct. App. July 15, 2008).
177. Id. at *6.
178. Id. (observing that the PA expert witness had "not demonstrated any knowledge of
what a Tennessee nurse practitioner should be doing under these circumstances") (emphasis
added).
179. Id.
180. McLean, supra note 3.
181. See infra, Part III, Section C.
182. Land, 2008 WL 4254155 at *1.
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practice,1 3 Land's holding means that in all but the most straight forward
cases, only PAs can establish the standard of care against PAs because only
a PA would have sufficient understanding of the PA school of practice to
provide such testimony. (This rule would be similarly applied NPs.)
Moreover, if formal training for PAs and NPs continues to diverge (as has
been recommended by the IOM and RWJFl 8 4) then courts will find it easier
to limit PE expert testimony to members of the same school of practice. 8 1
Before leaving this section on standard of care, a comment on causation
is appropriate. In many medical malpractice actions involving physicians,
the plaintiffs expert witness does double duty by setting the standard of
care and testifying to causation. Thus far, however, modern courts have
been unwilling to allow PEs to testify as to medical causation.' 86 The key
reason that the courts have found PEs incompetent to testify on causation is
the superior medical knowledge of physicians.187 These courts reason that
PEs, who provide only limited protocol-based medical services, are not
required to be knowledgeable about medical causation.8
Thus, in PE medical malpractice actions where the plaintiff has either a
complex medical condition or treatment (i.e., where the standard of care for
a physician and PE are not likely to be identical), plaintiffs should be
prepared to hire a PE from the same school of practice to set the standard of
care and a physician to testify on causation. This means that, all other
things being equal, PE medical malpractice cases are likely to be more
183. See supra note 166; Planned Parenthood of N.W. Ind. v. Vines, 543 N.E.2d 654,
660 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); but cf McElhaney v. Harper-Hutzel Hosp., 711 N.W.2d 795, 80001 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005); Simonson v. Keppard, 225 S.W.3d 868, 873-74 (Tex. App. 2007).
184. See supra notes 116-120 and related text.
185. A decade in the future, when PA and NP training becomes ever more specialized,
the use of physician cross-over witnesses to set the standard of care against PEs many no
longer be appropriate.
186. Nasser v. St. Vincent Hosp., 926 N.E.2d 43, 46 (Ind. App. 2010) ("only a physician
can testify to causation"); Smith v. HCA Health Servs., 977 A.2d 534, 539 (N.H. 2009) (a
NP is not "unqualified to testify to causation"); Hopkins Cnty. Hosp. v. Ray, No. 06-0800129-CV, 2009 WL 454338 (Tex. App. Feb. 24, 2009); cf. Bradford v. Alexander, 886
S.W.2d 394 (Tex. Ct. App 1994) citing Ponder v. Texarkana Mem'l Hosp., 840 S.W.2d 476,
478 (Tex. App. 1991, writ denied) ( "'[non-physicians may qualify as medical experts by
virtue of special experience.' In that case, the court held that an individual with masters
degrees in both physiology and biology and a doctorate in neuroscience (a multidisciplinary
study of how the brain works) was competent to testify about causation of the plaintiffs
brain damage"(citation omitted)).
187. See supra note 186.
188. E.g., see Land v. Barnes, No. M2008-00191-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 4254155 at
*6 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 15, 2008). A nurse practitioner "is prohibited from making a
medical diagnosis and, therefore, he or she lacks the expertise to testify as to causation.
Since a physician's assistant may only render diagnostic or therapeutic services under the
'supervision, control and responsibility of a licensed physician,' there is considerable doubt
that a physician's assistant would be competent to testify as to causation." Id. (Citations
omitted).
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expensive than physician medical malpractice because plaintiffs in PE
medical malpractice cases will need to hire a second expert witness.
C. PE Malpractice
1. Agency and Vicarious Liability
Next, we need to consider whether the physician who supervises a PE
Vicarious liability, of which respondeat
can be held vicariously liable.
superior is but one form,' 90 turns on the establishment of an agency
relationship. 9 ' An agency, in turn:
is defined as the fiduciary relationship which results from manifestation
of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and
subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act ... Thus, the three
elements required to show the existence of an agency relationship include:
(1) a manifestation by the principal that the agent will act for him; (2)
acceptance by the agent of the undertaking; and (3) an understanding
between the parties that the principal will be in control of the
undertaking ... The existence of an agency relationship is [thus] a question
of fact.19 2
Recently, the PA-physician agency relationship was comprehensively
reviewed by the Supreme Court of Tennessee. In Cox v MA. Primary and
Urgent Care Clinic,'3 a case of first impression, a plaintiff filed a medical
malpractice lawsuit against a clinic and the physician supervising a PA for
the PA's allegedly negligent health care delivery. 194 Interestingly, the
plaintiff in Cox did not name the PA as a defendant. Accordingly, the
dispositive issue under review by the court was whether an agency
relationship existed between the PA and the physician such that the
physician could be held vicariously liable for the acts of the PA.' 95
189. Vicarious liability (based on agency) is to be contrasted with liability based on
negligent hiring and supervising PEs (See Moreno v Quinrana, 324 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. App.
2010)). A detailed discussion of the negligent hiring and supervising PEs is beyond the
scope of this article.
190. A comprehensive review of agency law is beyond the scope of this article.
191. Pierzga v. Charlotte Hungerford Hosp., No. LLICVO95006121S, 2010 WL
4352298 at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 6, 2010) ("claims of vicarious liability for medical
negligence require a plaintiff to make specific allegations about the alleged agency
relationship").
192. Id. citing Wesley v. Schaller Subaru, 892 A.2d 389 (D.C. 2006).
193. Cox v. M.A. Primary and Urgent Care Clinic, 313 S.W.3d 240 (Tenn. 2010).
194. Id.at251.
195. Id. A very interesting aspect of this case that was not address by the court is the fact
that PA owned the clinic and employed the physician who then nominally supervised the PE.
Id. In the legal profession, the analogous relationship would be for a paralegal to own the
law practice and employ the attorney. The business relationship in Cox demonstrates just
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The court began its analysis by observing that a PA-physician
relationship falls into one of three basic patterns. First, a significant
number of states have adopted statutes specifying that a physician assistant
is an agent of his or her supervising physician. A few states have
legislation specifically providing that a supervising physician is liable for
the acts or omissions of his or her physician assistant. Numerous other
states have legislation similar to Tennessee's, which refers more generally
to the supervising physician's "responsibility" for his or her physician

assistant. 196
Viewed this way, PAs in the first group are explicit statutory agents of
their physician masters, 197 while PAs in the second group are implicit
statutory agents of their physician masters. 198
A priori, however, it is not readily apparent whether the court's third
group for PA-physician relationships, which is predicated on a physician
being "responsible" for the PA's conduct, is an agency relationship. In the
next paragraph of the court's opinion, however, which concerns a
physician's responsibility, Cox goes on to explain that as a general matter, a
physician assistant stands in an agency relationship with his or her
supervising physician when the physician assistant is providing authorized
medical services within the scope of the parties' joint protocol.' 99 The
Tennessee Supreme Court then closed the responsibility loop for this third
group by explicitly stating, "the physician assistant occupies the role of
agent and the supervising doctor occupies the role of principal."20 0
In short, while the Cox review of the statutory language describing PAhow far down the rabbit hole the interaction between PEs and physicians can slide in real
life. Lewis Carroll: Alice in Wonderland. cf Petzel v Valley Orthopedics, 770 N.W.2d 787,
793 (2009) (PEs cannot control physicians' practices).
196. Cox, 313 S.W.3d at 252 (footnote citations omitted).
197. Id. at note 13.
198. Id. at note 14. While the statues cited do not explicitly state the legal bases for
holding a physician liable for PE conduct, vicarious liability predicated on agency is
certainly contemplated. For example, the purpose behind the Florida statute cited by the
court "is to encourage more effective utilization of the skills of physicians or groups of
physicians by enabling them to delegate health care tasks to qualified assistants when such
delegation is consistent with the patient's health and welfare." Fla. Stat. § 458.347 (2010).
Such language implicitly contemplates a master-slave agency relationship.
199. Cox, 313 S.W.3d at 253 citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-19-106(b) (2010) ("[al
physician assistant shall function only under the control and responsibility of a licensed
physician" and that "[t]here shall, at all times, be a physician who is answerablefor the
actions of the physician assistant."; and Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0880-03-.02(1) (2010)
("[s]ervices rendered by the physician assistant must be provided under the supervision,
direction, and ultimate responsibility of a licensed physician") (emphasis added).
Dictionary.com,
also
Responsible Definition,
at
253;
see
200. Id.
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse /responsible (last visited Apr. 30, 2011). Responsible
is to be "answerable or accountable, as for something within one's power, control, or
management," which contemplates an agency relationship.
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physician relationships is dividable based on verbiage, the Cox analysis
indicates that all such relationships are agency relationships. 201 The
universality of this agency relationship between PAs and physicians is true
regardless of degree of autonomy that the states' scope of practice acts
grants the PAs. Accordingly, when a PA is acting within the scope of their
collaborative agreements, physician supervisors will be vicariously liable
for the negligent acts of their PA subordinates.
In contrast, courts have been less willing to find that NP-physician
relationships are categorically agency relationships. For NPs a claim for
vicarious liability against a supervising physician cannot be based on the
relevant nurse practitioner statutes and regulations alone.20 2
Rather the courts prefer to contemplate physicians' vicarious liability for
the conduct of NPs according to the factor-type analysis for respondeat
superior liability. For example, when a Virginia court contemplated
whether a master-servant relationship exists between a physician and NP,
the factors the court considered were the nature of the NP's: "(1) selection
and engagement; (2) payment of compensation; (3) [the physician's] power
of dismissal; and (4) [the physician's] power of control."203 Of these
factors, only the physician's power to control over the NP is "is
determinative."204
The reason the courts apply a different legal calculus to determine
whether physicians are vicariously liable for PAs and NPs can be traced to
the history of these disciplines. PAs were first introduced into the medical
profession to assist cardiac surgeons in the operating room. 2 05 Surgeons
were also the first to develop PA training programs.206 This historic
supervisory nexus between PAs and physicians accounts for the reason why
PAs do not have an independent state governing board, and why in all fifty
states PAs report to the state boards of medicine.207 Thus, it is not
surprising that the courts have found an automatic agency relationship
exists between PAs and their physician supervisors.

201. An agency analysis of a PA-physician relationship can be avoided if the PA is
employed by the physician. See Marchisotti v Williams, No. 13106/02, 2006 WL 1152576,
at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 24, 2006) (an employment agreement establishes agency).
202. Morvillo v. Shenandoah Mem'1 Hosp., No. 5:07CV00046, 2008 WL 4179264, at
*8 (W.D. Va. Sept. 10, 2008).
203. Id. citing Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825, 832 (Va. 1982).
204. Id.
205. John Kirklin, MD Award History, Am. Ass'n of Physician Assistants,
http://www.aaspa.com/page.asp?tid=136&name=John-W-Kirklin-MD-AwardHistory&navid=45 (last visited Apr. 30, 2011); John Webster Kirklin, Physician Assistant
History Ctr., http://www.pahx.org/kriklinBio.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2011).
206. See supra note 205.
207. Telephone Interview with Stephanie Radix, State Regulatory Affairs, Am. Acad. of
Physician Assistants (Nov. 12, 2010).
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Nurses, in contrast, can trace their professional history to a time long
before Florence Nightingale.20 8 As such, the nursing profession developed
independently of the medical profession and accordingly developed its own
regulatory scheme. Today, in all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and
four United States' territories, nurses have their own independent boards for
professional oversight. 20 9 This professional autonomy from physician
oversight, which the nursing profession has enjoyed throughout its long
history, undermines any presumption that a master-slave relationship exists
between physicians and nurses. Hence, without more, the normally
occurring physician-NP relationship lacks the level of control necessary to
establish an agency relationship.
Yet, despite these judicially perceived differences in PA and NP
professional liability, a decade after the IOM called for more health care to
be delivered by multi-collaborative teams, both PAs and NPs find
themselves increasingly being named as defendants in medical malpractice
actions.2 10 This, of course, was predictable.2 11
2. Insurance
Indeed, during the last decade, while medical malpractice claims against
physicians (for negligent patient care) have fallen, 2 12 data from the National
Practitioner Data Bank indicate that medical malpractice claims and
judgments against both NPS2 13 and PAS2 14 have increased, as have claims
208. The
History
of
Nursing,
Gonursingschools.com,
http://www.gonursingschools.com/TheHistoryof_ Nursing.htm (last visited Apr. 30,
2011).
209. Member Boards, National Council of State Boards of Nursing,
https://www.ncsbn.org/521.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2011).
210. The increasing incidence of PEs being named as defendants in medical malpractice
actions is out-of-proportion to their increasing presences in the marketplace. See infra, Part
III, Section C, Subsection 2.
211. McLean, supra note 3. A priori the number of adverse medical errors associated
with team-delivered health care is likely to be higher than traditionally delivered healthcare
because the PEs who substitute for physicians are less educated; and the obligatory handoffs
between team members increase the number of communication errors. Id.; cf John D.
Birkmeyer, Strategiesfor Improving Surgical Quality - Checklists and Beyond 363 New
Eng. J. Med. 1963, 1964 (2010); citing Eefje N. de Vries et al., Effect of a Comprehensive
Surgical Safety System on Patient Outcomes, 363 New Eng. J. Med. 1928 (2010)
(suggesting, without explanation, that team-delivered healthcare may have fewer
communication errors).
212. Gail Garfinkel Weiss, Survey: Malpractice premiums. Modem Med. (Nov. 20,
2009), http:// www.modemmedicine.com/modernmedicine/Modem
+Medicine+Now/Survey-Malpractice-premiums/ ArticleStandard/
Article/detail/643717. As claims against physicians have fallen so have their premiums. Id.
213. Kevin P. Miller, Malpractice Trends: Viewing the Data and Avoiding the Hot Seat
of Litigation, 5 J. Nurse Pract. 662, 662 (2009) (medical malpractice claims against NPs
increased thirty-six percent between 2004 and 2008).
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against physicians when they act as supervisors to PEs.2 15
Yet, like standard of care and physician-PE agency relationships,
medical malpractice claims against NPs and PAs are distinguishable with
respect to quality of data that is available, demographics, and the type of
coverage offered by insurers. Primarily due to two studies published by
CNA (in 2004216 and 2009217), our knowledge of NP medical malpractice
claims demographics is superior to that for PAs. CNA's data for these two
studies is summarized in the Table I below. CNA's data demonstrates that
during a recent five-year period, while the NP profession's size increased
by 17%, the number of claims against NPs increased by 140%; a figure that
parallels the 141% increase in indemnity payouts to settle these claims.
Given that most NPs practice in an office setting, it is not surprising that
CNA's data shows that the most common medical malpractice claim made
against NP was for negligent diagnosis.
Table I: CNA's Demographics for NP medical malpractice claims.
Percent

Number of NP practicing
in

2004218

2008219

Change

115,000

135,000220

17%

22,311

25,000

12%

America

Number of NP covered
under by CNA polices

214. Jeffery G. Nicholson, A Study of Malpractice and Safety Comparing PAs to
Physicians
and
APNs,
Physician
Assistant
Expert
Network,
LLC,
http://www.hgexperts.com/article.asp?id=5878 (last visited Apr. 30, 2011) ("rate of
malpractice incidence increased for PAs ... over the study period"). This study, which at
times appears to be self-contradictory, appears not to have been published in a peer-reviewed
journal because the article suffers from a number of scientific limitations, including: a lack
of systematic methodology and the presentation of conclusions without the inclusion of
supporting data.
215. Cliff Rapp, Lowering Physician Extenders Liability: Effective Loss Prevention, 59
Ne. Fl. Med. 33, 33 (2008).
216. See generally Nurse Practitioner Claims Study 1994-2004, CNA,
http://www.cna.com/vcm-content/
CNA/internet/Static%20File%20for%20Download/Risk%20Control/Medical%20Services/N
ursePractitionerClaimsStudy.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2011) [hereinafter Claims Study].
217. See generally CNA, supra note 35.
218. Claims Study, supra note 216, at 2.
219. See generally CNA, supra note 35.
220. CNA's 2009 data did not contain a figure for the number of practicing NP.
Accordingly, this figure was taken from AAPN data. See About AANP, Am. Acad. of Nurse
Practitioners, http://www.aanp.org/ AANPCMS2/AboutAANP (last visited Apr. 30, 2011).
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Number of claims filed

841

239

1799

140%

Allegations
of 81.6%
misdiagnosis or treatment
plan

85%

4%

Office practice was the
location of the alleged

75%

84.3%

12%

$16.5 M
$153,775

$39.7 M
$189,300

141%
23%

again CNA insured NPs

NP malpractice

Total Indemnity Paid out
Average Indemnity Paid
out

per

claim

I

I

I

I

CNA followed-up on these studies with a survey of its insured. 221 This
NP survey's findings of interest include: eighty-six percent of respondents
were female; 22 2 the average NP had practiced for thirteen years as an RN
before becoming an NP; 223 the average NP had been in practice seven years
before a claim was made against him or her; 224 and the scope of a NP's
practice (i.e., no physician oversight, direct physician supervision, or
practice under a collaborative agreement) had no impact on whether a claim
was filed.225
CNA provides professional liability coverage to NPs with occurrence
policies.226 While a detailed discussion of the actuarial considerations
underlining insurance underwriting is beyond the scope of this article, a few
general comments about occurrence policies are in order. Under an
occurrence policy, with its:
stable premium rates that do not automatically increase each year,
provides coverage that responds to a malpractice incident arising out of
professional services and/or care rendered during the policy period
regardless of when the actual claim is reported. Should an Occurrence
policy be cancelled, the purchase of "tail" coverage to extend the reporting
period for claims is not required.22 7
221.
because
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
2010).
227.

CNA, supra note 35, at 30. The accuracy of this survey should be questioned
the response rate to this survey was only four percent. Id.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 38.
Id.
Interview with Nilza Wise, Customer Service Representative, CNA Ins. (Oct. 10,
Pittsburg Property & Casualty, Inc., Malpractice Insurance Frequently Asked
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Although prior acts are not covered under occurrence polices, these
policies tend to be expensive because, in essence, the insured prepays their
tail coverage.228
Comparable data for medical malpractice claims against PAs are hard to
come by. Using the best sources, however, an attempt was made to collect
data similar to the data collected by CNA for NPs. 2 29 These compiled
results are summarized below in Table 11.230 The data indicate that although
our health care system employs about half as many PAs as NPs, the growth
rate for medical malpractice claims filed against these two disciplines are
similar. Interestingly, Rapp found that when compared with physician
medical malpractice claims, PAs' medical malpractice claims had a greater
231
percentage of claims (forty-two percent) result in an indemnity payment.
Table II: Compiled Demographics for NP medical malpractice claims.

Number of
practicing
America

23

PAs
in

Approximately

Approximately

Percent

2004

2008

Change

67,000

77,000

17%

2

Questions, http://pittsburghpropertyandcasualty.com/_pages/malpractice-insurance-faqs.html
(last visited Apr. 30, 2011).
228. PIAM,
Claims-made
v
Occurrence
Coverage
(2010),
http://www.piam.com/InsuranceProducts/ claimsmade.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2011).
229. Both the data on NP malpractice from CNA (see supra notes 35 and 218), and the
data on PA malpractice from Physicians Insurance Association of America (PIAA) (Rapp,
supra note 215), can be criticized because these studies introduce sampling error. CNA's and
PIAA's data is only representative of the providers covered by these insurers. Conversely,
the data presented by CNA and PIAA may not be representative of the data for all NPs and
PAs.
230. Data included here for PA claims was selected because based on the sample size of
the claims' data in the original source. However, smaller samples sized data, which does not
lend easily to comparisons, is also available. See State of Connecticut: Connecticut Medical
cid/lib/cid/
2010),
http://www.ct.gov/
Report
(May
Malpractice Annual
MedicalMalpractice2l0Report.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2011). Of the 1376 medical
malpractice claims filed during a recent five year period (2005-9) in the State of
Connecticut, 19 (1.15%) were against NPs and RNs, 5 (0.31%) were against PAs, and 30
(1.87%) were filed against PCPs. Id at Report 8, Part I. The average indemnity of paid
claims was approximately the same for the two groups: $513,487 was paid out on behalf of
NPs/RNs; and $530,560 was paid on behalf of PAs. Id. By comparison $529,542 was paid
out on behalf of PCPs. Id.
231. Rapp, supra note 215, at 33.
232. Interview with Josh Uhmar, AAPA Administrator (Oct. 28, 2010) cited the figure
used for "2008" data as the number of PAs practicing in the US in September 2010. By
comparison, the 2004 figure for the number of PAs practicing in America is from the
APAA's webpage for 2007. Am. Acad. Physician Assistants, Physician Assistant Practice
in Long Term Care Facilities (2007), http://www.aapa.org/advocacy-and-practice-
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Allegations
misdiagnosis

of N/A
or

241

Most common

N/A

$174,871

N/A

treatment"

Average

indemnity

N/A

paid out per claim 23 4

In contrast to NPs, insurers offer PAs professional liability coverage
under claims-made policies.2 35 Such policies require:
coverage to be in effect on the date care rendered and continuous and
still in effect on the date a resulting claim is made. Should a Claims-made
policy be cancelled, tail coverage must be purchased to provide coverage
for claims which may have occurred while the policy was in effect but not
made until after the cancellation date.236
Claims-made coverage, which includes retroactive coverage for prior
events that are reported during the coverage period, has premiums that are
less expensive than occurrence coverage. However, the methodology used
to calculate premiums for claims-made policies is complex.23 7
3. PEs and Legal Schizophrenia
In short, like PE economics, the PE legal concerns demonstrate elements
of schizophrenia. To illustrate such schizophrenia, consider the following
hypothetical, which assumes that the scope of practice for NPs and PAs in a
given state is identical. Now imagine two identical patients with identical
resources/issue-briefs/494-physician-assistant-practice-in-long-term-care-facilities
(last
visited Apr. 30, 2011).
233. Rapp, supra note 215, at 33. Rapp's data came from PIAA's closed claims
documents; whereas CNA's data included both closed and open claims.
234. Id. Although the data for this study was collected over a twenty-year period, the
author did not adjust his average indemnity payment calculation for constant dollars. Id. Cf
Nicholson, supra note 214 (average indemnity payment to settle PA litigation was $173,128
in constant dollars).
235. A detailed discussion of the merits of occurrence versus claims-made policies is
beyond the scope of this article.
236. Pittsburg Prop. and Cas. (PPC), MalpracticeInsurance FrequentlyAsked Questions
(2010),
http://pittsburghpropertyandcasualty.com/_pages/malpractice-insurance-faqs.html
(last visited Apr. 30, 2011).
237. PIAM, supra note 228. "Claims made coverage involves a step process with
premium increases over the first five years of coverage in increments proportional to the
claims reporting for that experience. The initial premium and subsequent years' premium are
substantially lower than an occurrence policy. By the fourth or fifth year the claims made
premium reaches a mature level and premium adjustments are based on annual rate changes
only." Id.
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medical conditions come to the same PCMH for treatment. One of these
patients is seen by a NP, and the other patient is seen by a PA. Imagine
further that both the NP and the PA make the same diagnostic error and
produce identical injuries in the two patients. Seeking compensation, both
patients file identically worded lawsuits in the same courthouse against the
treating NP and PA.
The question is: does the law treat these two plaintiffs identically?
Maybe not. As suggested by Cox, the differences in schools of practice for
NPs and PAs mean that a jury's perception of the culpability for a
diagnostic error may not be the same for a NP and a PA. The plaintiff
treated by the PA may have a more difficult time establishing the standard
of care because there are fewer PAs per capita than NPs. Additionally,
because the premium for medical malpractice coverage for NPs is greater
than the premium for PAs, more NPs may be practicing without
coverage.23 If so, the patients who are treated by NPs may be less likely to
obtain compensation in the event of injury.
In short, under our existing laws, two identical patients with identical
iatrogenic injuries may receive different levels of compensation depending
on whether their provider was a NP or a PA. This is concerning, and may
provide some explanation for why RMCs prefer to hire NPs, rather than
PAs. Second, a schizophrenic disconnect exists in the idea that the use of
tort law will encourage PEs to provide safe, i.e., non-negligent, healthcare.
It is well recognized that medical malpractice actions are a poor
methodology to get physicians to internalize the costs associated with safe
medical practices.
There is nothing intrinsic to the operation of a RMC or a PCMH that
modifies the application of tort law so as to encourage PEs to practice
safely any more than tort law encourages PCPs to practice safely.240
Therefore, even if the IOM/RWJF's recommendations for PE training 24 1 are
adopted and enacted so that PE-delivered care becomes fungible with PCPdelivered care, why should we anticipate that PCMH-delivered healthcare
238. While I am unaware of any state licensure laws that mandate NPs or PAs to
purchase medical malpractices coverage (as many state laws do for physicians), it is likely
that whoever has hired a NP or PA will have purchased insurance to cover their own
vicarious liability. Thus it is likely that a patient who sustains an iatrogenic injury at the
hands of PE will be able to recover some compensation after a showing of PE negligence.
239. Edward P. Richards & Thomas R. McLean, Administrative Compensation for
Medical MalpracticeInjuries: Reconciling the Brave New World of Patient Safety and the
Torts System, 49 St. Louis U. L.J. 73, 82 (2004).
240. McLean, supra note 3, at 243.
241. IOM/RWJF, supra note 114. Technically, the IOM/RWJF's recommendations only
apply to NPs. However, if PAs and other PEs do not ramp up their entry level education
requirements, these providers will be crowded out of the market as nurses secure more
leadership positions.
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will be any safer than traditionally-delivered healthcare? This is not a moot
question. As humans, both PEs and PCPs make mistakes and respond to
economic stimuli. So, if we place future PEs in the same role as current
PCPs and provide them with same economic incentives, why should we
hold a schizophrenic expectation that these future PEs will produce a better
(or even the same) clinical outcomes than are currently being provided by
PCPs? 242
IV. MARKET REGULATION OF PES

Fast-forward to 2020, the year of good vision. The Accountable Care
Organization (ACO), developed under the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA),243 is now the fundamental business
organization for the delivery of healthcare. 24 ACOs, whose public face
will often be the PCMH,245 will measure:
quality and cost at the hospital staff level [thereby helping to] pinpoint
examples of overuse of services that would not otherwise be identified.
Bringing these instances to light can help hospital leaders initiate activities
that lead to improved quality and lowered costs, such as investing in care
management, reducing acute care capacity, and forgoing unnecessary
specialist recruitment.24 6
242. Einstein "famously" observed that a definition of insanity is doing the same thing
over again but expecting a different outcome. You know, Einstein said the definition of
insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results, Newsweek
(Apr. 13, 2010), http://newsweek.tumblr.com/post/
518155653/you-know-einstein-said-the-definition-of-insanity. If all the coming PCMHs do
is to substitute doctor-level post-graduate trained PEs for our current PCPs we will have
changed nothing and should not expect our health care system to be better.
243. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148,
124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 21, 25-26, 29 & 42 U.S.C.)
Technically, the concept of an Accountable Care Organization, which is currently only at the
proving stage of development, was articulated by Elliot Fisher of Dartmouth University.
Stephen Camper, Accountable Care Organizations: Lights! Cameras! But Where's the
Magazine,
Reform
Health
Nat'1
Action?,
http://www.healthcarereformmagazine.com/article/accountable-care-organizations-lightscameras.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2011).
244. A detailed discussion of ACOs is beyond the scope of this article. See generally
Accountable Care Organizations: A model for sustainable innovation, Deloitte (2010),
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-United States/Local%20Assets
/Documents/US CHSAccountableCareOrganizations 041910.pdf.
245. Terry McGeeney, The Patient-CenteredMedical Home and the Accountable Care
http://www.delta2010),
1,
(Nov.
Exchange
Delta
Organization,
exchange.net/blogs/ceoreportpublic/thepatientcenteredmedical
homeandtheaccountablecare.
246. Elliott S. Fisher et al., Creating Accountable Care Organizations: The Extended
22,
2007),
(Feb.
Fund
Commonwealth
The
Hospital Medical Staff
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/Publications/In-theLiterature/2007/Feb/Creating-Accountable-Care-Organizations-The-Extended-Hospital-

Published by LAW eCommons, 2011

39

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 20 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 5

244

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 20

In other words, health care reformers envision administrative controls to
be the way to regulated the market and reduce medical errors. There is no
question that the elimination of unnecessary medical treatmentS247 Will
avoid some medical errors. After all, when medical services are not
provided, iatrogenic injury is impossible. But a priori, there is nothing
about an ACO- as we now know understand the concept- or quality
monitoring or even administrative controls per se that will reduce the
2 48
Therefore, whether
incidence of provider-errorsper patient-treated.
ACOs' heightened medical monitoring of provider care will translate into
an actual improvement in quality, i.e., a reduction in the number of
provider-errors per patient-treated, is debatable.249
So, forgetting about quality, how will ACOs' use of administrative
controls to hold PEs accountable? Theoretically, under the PPACA,
individual PEs (and physicians) will not be held accountable because ACOs
are to focus on provider organizations, not providers. 25 0 To the extent that
any ACO performance measures are publicly reported, the reported figures
are to be limited to those quality metrics that represent the organization.25 1
Yet, it would be nave to think that ACOs will not use adverse providerspecific performance data against PEs. In 2006, the IOM recommended
that providers who habitually fail to meet their prescribed performance
measure targets be "removed" from the market.252 In that same year,
federal government took its first steps to launching a provider-specific
report card for physicians; 253 a report card that would be completely
Medical-Staff.aspx (last visited Apr. 30, 2011) (emphasis added).
247. What medical treatments are unnecessary, of course depend on whether you are the
patient or the payor. However, there are certain conditions for which there is little scientific
basis; and even less science underlying treatment. Patricia Callahan & Trine Tsouderos, A
at
available
2010,
8,
Dec.
Trib.,
Chi.
Diagnosis,
Dubious
http://www.chicagotribune.com/health/ct-met-chronic-lyme-disease20101207,0,5671843.story?page=2(discussing the lack of scientific foundation for chronic
Lyme disease and how those who treat this condition profit).
248. Jeffery S. Eisenberg, Never say "Never": Surgical Errors Remain a Concern, 7
at
available
3
(2011)
1,
News
Surgery
Thoracic
http://www.aats.org/multimedia/files/Thoracic-Surgery-News/Thoracic-Surgery-NewsFebruary-2011 .pdf. This article observes that despite the ubiquitous use of a surgical time
out since 2004, wrong sided surgery still occurs at an alarming rate -even when we have NP,
PAs, and nurses watching the doctors. Id.
249. A more detailed discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this article.
250. See Fisher,supra note 246. Cf Michael E. Porter, What Is Value in Health Care?
363 New Eng. J. Med. 2477, 2477-79 (2010) (arguing that if we are truly interested in health
care quality, rather than collecting provider metrics, metrics that patients value, i.e.,
outcomes, should be measured).
251. Porter, supra note 250, at 2478.
252. See Institute of Medicine: Rewarding Provider Performance: Aligning Incentives in
Medicare, 2006.
253. See Medicare Improvements and Extension Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, Div.
B, § 101 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(k)); Medicare Improvements for Patients and
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analogues to government's web-based provider-specific report card for
hospitals.254 In the last four years, evidence has accumulated that report
cards do reduce the supply of providers 25 5 and to a reduced volume of
services prescribed.256 As health care reformers want to hold PEs
accountable, 257 it is likely that PEs - like hospitals and physicians - will
ultimately be subject to quality monitoring and publicly reviewable report
cards.258
Although report cards improve market transparency and create
reputational incentives for "low-quality providers" to exit the market, the
societal gains are debatable. 2 59 Interestingly, twenty-first century health
care reformers continue to believe that the improved market transparency
produced by provider-specific report cards is a universal good. The theory
behind this assumption may seem solid, but in practice, report cards for PEs
(or for PCPs for that matter) are unlikely to be a universal good in the long
run. Joshua Cooper Ramo has observed that the constant watching and
monitoring of individuals predictably increases the level of mistrust and

Providers Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-275 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.);
Medicare, Medicaid and SCHIP Extension Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-173 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); See Big Brother,supra note 93, at 10-11.
254. Hospital Compare, Dep't of Health & Human Serv. (Dec. 11, 2010),
https://hospitalcompare.hhs.gov.
255. Ashish K. Jha & Arnold M. Epstein, The Predictive Accuracy of the New York
State CoronaryArtery Bypass Surgery Report-CardSystem, 25 Health Aff. 844, 844 (2006)
(reporting that within three years of the publication of a provider-specific report, twenty
percent of surgeons in the highest mortality cohort exited a state market; whereas during the
same period only five percent of surgeons in the lowest mortality cohort exited that same
market). See also Walter H. Ettinger et al., When Things Go Wrong: The Impact of Being a
Statistical Outlier in Publicly Reported Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery Mortality
Data, 23 Am. J. Med. Quality 90, 90 (2008).
256. See, e.g., Percutaneous Coronary Interventions, supra note 104, at 30 (discussing
how report cards fueled a statistically significant reduction in complex high-risk cardiac
surgery procedures); see generally Patrick S. Ramano & Hong Zhou, Do Well-Publicized
Risk-Adjusted Outcomes Affect Hospital Volume?, 42 Med. Care 367 (2004).
257. IOM/RWJF, supra note 114, at 221.
258. See generally Victoria Stagg Elliott, Accountable Care Organizations: How Your
Practice Can Profit, Am. Med. News, Sept. 27, 2010, available at http://www.amaassn.org/amednews/2010/09/20/bisa0920.htm;Naylor & Kurtzman, supra note 143, at 897;
cf IOM/RWJF, supra note 114, at 14 (while the IOM and RWJF want to hold PEs more
accountable, the details of accountability are sparse. This 600-page tome on the future of
nursing mentions "accountability" less than a dozen times; and then only in a cursory
context).
259. Daniel R. Levinson, Medical Mistakes Plague Medicare Patients, USA Today
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/2010-11-162010),
16,
(Nov.
1ST N.htm#. "A decade after an Institute of Medicine study placed preventable
levinsonl6
medical errors among the leading causes of death in the United States, our latest study found
that a disturbing number of hospitalized patients still endure harmful consequences from
medical care, 44% percent of them preventable." Id.
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fear. 2 60 To illustrate, consider a situation where everyone is required to live
in glass houses. The glass houses would greatly facilitate the monitoring of
your neighbors' activities. Now, suppose you observe your neighbor
cleaning his gun: are you more or less likely to feel secure now that you
know your neighbor's personable habits? 2 1 For physicians, there is already
evidence that enhanced transparency negatively impacts their life-styles. 26 2
We should expect that report cards will similarly negatively impact PEs'
life-styles.
In addition to the negative aspects of improved transparency, PE-specific
report cards have two other potential detractors.263 Report cards are an
artificial measurement of quality. This is because many things cannot be
measured directly,2 64 and what is measured gets done 2 65 regardless of
whether it is meaningful.266 Worse, artificial quality measurements create a
false sense of security with respect to determining whether a situation is
getting better.
For example, former Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara famously used a high "body count" metric as a quality index of
for the U.S. Army, even while the United States was losing the Vietnam
War.267 Similarly, PEs (and physicians) may have a great report card while
not necessarily providing quality care.268
Indeed, the perverse incentives created by artificial quality metrics can
have a deleterious effect on our health care system. For example, consider
the potential negative impact of the monitoring of surgical site infections

260. See Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Age of the Unthinkable, 25-27 (1st ed. 2009); see
also Thomas R. McLean, The Impact ofProvider-SpecificReport Cards on CoronaryArtery
Bypass Graft Volume, 8 Am. Heart Hosp. J. 14, 16 (2010) (suggesting that the evidence that
physician-specific report cards increase mistrust exists, but is inferential); Thomas R.
McLean, Reputational Incentives: How Improving Transparency Can Drive Hospital
Competition, 7 Am. Heart Hosp. J. 27, 27 (2009).
261. See Ramo, supra note 260, at 27.
262. Jha & Epstein, supranote 255, at 851; PercutaneousCoronaryInterventions,supra
note 104, at 35.
263. For this paper it is assumed that the quality metrics used will be derived from errorfree analysis. This assumption may not be true. See, e.g., Ramo, supra note 260, at 173-78
(illustrating that metrics selected on historic data can be misleading because they do not
anticipate future changes that have not occurred in the past and therefore, measurements
taken from a system that is not at stead-state can be misleading because not all externalities
will be controlled).
264. For example, love or trust.
265. What Gets Measured Gets Done, Hoovers Bus. Insight Zone (Jan. 8, 2010),
http://www.hooversbiz.com/ 2010/01/08/what-gets-measured-gets-done.
266. See Ramo, supra note 260, at 163-64.
267. Robert S. McNamara, Texas Tech. Univ., Vietnam Ctr. & Archive,
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu /resources/mcnamara (last visited Apr. 30, 2011).
268. Veena Guru et al., PubliclyReported ProviderOutcomes: The Concerns of Cardiac
Surgeons in a Single-Payer System, 25 Can. J. Cardiology 33, 37 (2009) (discussing the
gaming of quality metrics).
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(SSIs). Routinely monitored performance measurements for SSIs include
intraoperative data (e.g., proper antibiotic administration) and postoperative
data (e.g., proper glucose control and avoidance of hypoxemia and
hypothermia).26 9 What is not used as quality metrics for SSIs are
preoperative - or patient specific factors - like the presence of diabetes,
smoking history, use of steroids, homelessness, and obesity.
Now consider a surgeon who is evaluating a patient for an elective
The SSI data on the provider-specific report cards create
surgery.
reputational incentives for the surgeon to avoid being associated with SSIs.
So, any surgeon who wished to avoid being a "bad doc" has an incentive to
not offer surgery to homeless overweight diabetic patients who smoke. By
not operating on patients with risk factors for SSIs, the surgeon may be able
to avoid being associated with an excessive number of SSIs. 27 0 Viewed in
this light, the artificial quality metric of report cards look more like a
scheme to ration healthcare than as a legitimate tool to improve the quality
of patient care. 271
As PEs increasingly provide more patient care in PCMHs, and if PEs are
held accountable by quality metric report cards, then there is no reason to
believe that PEs will behave differently than surgeons subjected to the same
administrative tool to improve market transparency.27 2
Provider-specific quality metrics monitoring has one final unsavory
aspect. The cost of monitoring PEs (or PCPs) for compliance with their
collaborative agreements and performance measures creates a deadweight
cost on our health care system. A deadweight cost arises when the direct
73
For
impact of an economic event is lessened by its indirect effects. 2
example, if a government raises taxes to pay down its debt, a deadweight
loss can arise from the negative impact that higher taxes have on business
productivity (which then would impact that government's tax revenue
stream).2 74 In healthcare, the deadweight loss that has arguably received the
269. PercutaneousCoronaryInterventions, supra note 104, at 32-35.
270. For example, a patient who develops pneumonia after surgery is at increased risk of
developing an SSI.
271. I have no problem with rationing healthcare in this matter, so long as such rationing
is transparent; i.e., we publically announce to diabetics, smokers, patients on steroids, the
homeless, and the obese that they are less likely to receive surgical intervention.
272. Unlike the RMCs, which use screening guidelines to steer high-risk patients away,
PCHMs will not have the luxury of steering high-risk patients. Conceptually, while PEs
employed by PCMH could refer complex and high-risk patients to their physician overseers,
the use of similar quality metrics for PCPs and PEs will mean that reputational incentives
will create disincentives for physicians to use their discretion not to treat such patients. See
supra, Part II, Section A.
Lexicon,
Definition,
Fin.
Times
273. Deadweight
Cost
http://lexicon.ft.com/term.asp?t-deadweight-cost (last visited Apr. 30, 2011). (Note that in
the literature, deadweight cost and deadweight loss are used interchangeably).
274. Id.

Published by LAW eCommons, 2011

43

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 20 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 5

248

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 20

most attention in the literature is pharmaceutical patents.275
Yet, it is not hard to imagine that provider monitoring will create a
substantial deadweight cost. We assume that by monitoring health care
quality, a reduction in medical errors and adverse outcomes will be
achieved, thereby producing an automatic reduction in health care costs.
Certainly much of the patient safety literature, with its emphasis on cost
reduction, supports this point of view. 2 77 After all, it is to be expected that
by doing some provider-specific monitoring, there should be some quality
improvement because the reduction of certain types of medical errors, i.e.,
the harvesting of the "low-hanging fruit," would result in fewer adverse
outcomes. 2 78 In addition, the ramping up of provider-specific monitoring
system provides us with the additional advantage of employing many
individuals who saw their jobs move overseas during the past fifteen
279
years.
Yet, like most things in life, the relationship between quality monitoring
and improved quality is non-linear. 2 80 Rather, any investment in quality
275. Darius Lakdawalla & Neeraj Sood, Health Insurance as a Two-Part Pricing
Contract,
RAND
Corp.
&
NBER
(2009),
http://www.ftc.gov/be/seminardocs/081204nsood.pdf (arguing that the deadweight cost
associated with phannaceutical patents depends on a market's insurance mix).
276. Robert P. Smith, The Cost of Quality: Is "An Ounce of Prevention" Really Worth
"A
Pound
of
Cure"?,
Am.
Inst.
of
Architects
(2009),
http://info.aia.org/nwsltrpm.cfm?pagename=pm a 20050722_quality. "Philip B. Crosby's
landmark book, Quality Is Free, captured the imagination of many people interested in the
relationship between quality and operating efficiency. Fundamentally, Crosby argues that
the costs resulting from poor quality greatly exceed the costs required to produce a highquality product or service in the first place." Id. The assumption that quality is frees runs
through many of the IOM's publications, including To Err is Human (supra note 97) and
Crossing the Quality Chasm (supranote 144).
277. See generally Thomas R. McLean, The Implications of Patient Safety Research &
Risk ManagedCare, 26 S. Ill. U. L.J. 227 (2002).
278. Id. at 251. Whether such a favorable cost-to-benefit ratio can be sustained is
another issue. See Denise Grady, Study Finds No Progress in Safety at Hospitals, N.Y.
25,
2010,
at
Al,
available at http://www.nytimes.com
Times,
Nov.
/2010/11/25/health/research/25patient.html (observing that despite a decade's investment in
the reduction of medical error and adverse outcomes the return-on-investment has been
minimal); discussing Christopher P. Landrigan et al., Temporal Trends in Rates of Patient
Harm Resultingfrom Medical Care, 363 N. Eng. J. Med. 2124 (2010); Office of Inspector
Gen., Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Adverse Events in Hospitals: National Incidence
Among Medicare Beneficiaries (2010), http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-09-00090.pdf.
279. Perhaps because there are so many administrative positions charged with monitor
health care quality (e.g., quality control managers, patient safety officers, and outcomes data
managers) it is hard to get a handle on how many of these individuals are now employed in
the health care sector. But, if you are a direct patient care provider working in a hospital,
there is no question that the number of health care quality administrators employed in the
health care sector has skyrocketed in the past decade.
280. Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big
Difference, 258-59 (2000) (explaining that although we assume most relationships are linear,
in reality most relationships are non-linear).
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monitoring can only be expected to provide a positive return up to a point,
after which the any return on an investment in quality monitoring becomes
negative. 2811 So, despite the initial favorable results from quality
monitoring, a reasonable question is whether the United States has reached
the point of maximal benefit of provider-specific quality monitoring?
The answer to this question depends on your point of view. To
administrators and health care reformers, whose jobs depend on identifying
low-quality providers, the answer would be "no," because providers
continue to be non-compliant with "evidence-based medical practices." 2 82
For front line providers, on the other hand, who must increasingly answer to
quality control care managers in addition to patients, 2 83 and who are subject
to reputational incentives,284 the answer would be an unequivocal "yes."
Regardless of your position in this debate, expanding the providerspecific quality monitoring to PEs is likely to move us beyond the tipping
point of maximal quality benefits per dollar spent on monitoring. As our
health care labor force is expanded by an influx of both PEs and
physicians, 285 all of these providers will be subject to labor-intensive
medical record quality monitoring; 286 a process that is not necessarily made
less labor-intensive by the use of an EMR.287 Consequently, as the provider
labor pool increases, so will the pool of health care quality managersespecially if the RMC's zero tolerance for PE protocol violationS288
281. See Smith, supra note 276.
282. See Surgical Care Infection Prevention Update, Medscape (Nov. 29, 2010),
http://www.medscape.org /viewarticle/557689. For example, in 2007 because of surgeons'
low compliance rate with evidence-based perioperative antibiotics use, the government felt
compelled to introduce pay-for-performance bonuses to modify surgeons' behavior. Id.
283. To front line providers, medical monitoring administers are considered to be the
"quality control Gestapo." See Albert Speer, Infiltration (1981), (a theme of Speer's book is
that Gestapo's political activities acted as deadweight loss that impaired the productivity of
German war machine in World War II).
284. PercutaneousCoronaryInterventions, supra note 104, at 30.
285. Suzanne Sataline & Shirley S. Wang, Medical Schools Can't Keep Up, Wall St. J.
http://online.wsj.com/article/
2010),
12,
(Apr.
SB10001424052702304506904575180331528424238.html (discussing how medical schools
are ramping up their capacity).
286. Amy K. Rosen, Are We Getting Better at Measuring Patient Safety?, Web M&M,
Agency
for
Healthcare
Research
&
Quality
(Nov.
29,
2010),
http://www.webmm.ahrq.gov/perspective.aspx?perspectivelD=94.
287. See Michael F. Furukawa, T. S. Raghu & Benjamin B. M. Shao, Electronic
Medical Records, Nurse Staffing, and Nurse-Sensitive Patient Outcomes: Evidence from
CaliforniaHospitals, 1998-2007, 45 Health Serv. Research 941, 954 (2010) (stating that the
time required for nurses to enter quality metrics was not cost-efficient); Sandra Verelst et al.,
Validation of HospitalAdministrative Datasetfor Adverse Event Screening, 19 Quality &
Safety in Health Care, 1 (Apr. 27, 2010), at http://qualitysafety.bmj.com/content/19/5/
1.36.full.pdf?sid=a3O56cdf-d7ac-48cf-bcbb-a38dbd2890fa (electronic screening of medical
records for administrative quality data is not accurate).
288. See supra Part II, Section A.
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becomes the norm as every chart will require review.2 89 Under such
circumstances, when we have more individuals monitoring provider quality
than there are total providers (physicians plus PEs), it seems likely that
quality monitoring will have a substantial deadweight cost.
V. CONCLUSION

At what point will a phalanx of managers whose job it is to monitor the
quality metrics of PEs (and physicians) fail to be cost effective? I do not
know. This overview of market regulatory mechanisms for PEs indicates,
however, that administrative controls when used in isolation are unlikely to
reduce the provider-errorsper patient-treated,and hence are unlikely to be
cost-effective in the long run. This is not to say that legal controls are
necessarily better. Experiences with physicians suggest that enforcement of
licensure and scope of practice laws are far from optimal. 2 90 As we are
actively encouraging PEs to enter the market, it seems unlikely that we will
enforce licensure and scope of practice laws against PEs (even to the degree
that these laws are enforced against physicians). Nor is our medical
malpractice system effective in creating appropriate deterrence mechanisms
for providerS291 or creating appropriate compensation.292
After a decade of health care reform, it is unclear whether increased
utilization of PEs alone is the solution. I still think the long run solution for
controlling PEs, while maintaining the same level of quality of care, will
293
Will we
require the adoption of a no-fault or enterprise liability system.
ever have a no-fault or enterprise liability system? Again, I do not know.
What I do know is that a no-fault or enterprise liability system is a more
rational system for managing providers who have less than formal postgraduate training certified by a board of examiners who are authorized to
provide care in a team setting.294 The reason is simple: a system of no-fault
or enterprise liability aligns the interests of physicians, PEs, and ACOs in
such way that they all have a vested interest in providing high quality
patient care.

289. Presently, absent a triggering event, most physicians' charts are not reviewed; and
non-RMC PE charts are rarely reviewed.
290. See Press Release, Public Citizen Releases Annual Ranking of State Medical
Boards,
CommonDreams.org
(Apr.
5,
2010,
11:47
AM),
http://www.commondreams.org/newswire/2010/04/05-2.
291. Richards & McLean, supra note 239, at 81-82; but cf Victor R. Fuchs, Government
Paymentfor Health Care - Causes and Consequences, 363 New Eng. J. Med. 2181, 218182 (2010) (arguing that we as a society tolerate inefficient legal and economic systems
because someone of importance benefits).
292. Richards & McLean, supra note 239, at 75-77.
293. See generally McLean, supra note 3, at 276-95.
294. See id.
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Indeed, the IOM is in agreement on this point. The IOM first called for
the United States to adopt either no-fault or enterprise liability professional
insurance coverage in 1999,295 and recently affirmed the desirability of nofault liability coverage for certain clinical situations.29 6 In addition, if one
reviews the IOM's recommendations during the last decade and then
compares these recommendations with the subsequent health care policies
that are adopted by the United States, a clear pattern has emerged: what the
IOM recommends is what gets adopted by the government as health care
As the IOM has recommended a fundamental change in
policy.
professional liability coverage in favor of no-fault or enterprise liability, it
seems likely that tort reform that will be in place by 2020 for PE negligence
will be a system of no-fault or enterprise system.

295.
296.

IOM, supra note 97, at 111.
Inst. of Med., Priorities for a National Vaccination System 26 (2010).
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